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Highlights	  -­‐ We	   implement	   the	   multilevel	   Social	   Relations	   Model	   (SRM)	   for	   count	   data	   as	   a	  network	  response	  variable.	  -­‐ We	  examine	  gifts	  of	  meat	  exchanged	  over	  a	  yearlong	  period	  among	  25	  households	  in	  lowland	  Nicaragua.	  -­‐ Food	   sharing	   networks	   largely	   correspond	   to	   kin-­‐based	   networks	   of	   social	  interaction.	  -­‐ The	   results	  provide	   support	   for	  multiple	   evolutionary	  models	  of	   food	   sharing	  and	  cooperation.	  -­‐ We	   discuss	   further	   extensions	   to	   the	   SRM	   and	  methodological	   considerations	   for	  related	  research.	  	  
	   1	  
1.	  Introduction	  Compared	   to	   other	   animals,	   humans	   have	   a	   unique	   propensity	   for	   sharing	   food,	  which	  anthropologists	  have	  related	  to	  other	  traits	  that	  distinguish	  humans	  from	  other	  apes	  (Isaac,	  1978;	  Gurven	  et	  al.,	   2012;	  Wood	  and	  Marlowe,	  2013).	  Food	  sharing	  has	   therefore	  attracted	  considerable	  attention	   from	  evolutionary	  anthropologists	   (Gurven,	  2004;	   Jaeggi	  and	   Gurven	   2013).	   There	   are	   multiple	   hypotheses	   to	   explain	   transfers	   of	   food	   between	  households,	   and	   a	   common	   approach	   is	   to	   develop	   multivariate	   statistical	   models	   that	  simultaneously	   test	   the	   evidence	   for	   these	   alternative	   hypotheses	   (Ziker	   and	   Schnegg,	  2005;	   Allen-­‐Arave	   et	   al.,	   2008;	   Nolin,	   2010).	   Generally,	   however,	   these	   analyses	   explore	  only	  the	  role	  of	  covariates	  for	  which	  there	  is	  an	  unambiguous	  evolutionary	  hypothesis.	  Yet,	  evolutionary	  anthropologists	  are	  increasingly	  acknowledging	  the	  multifaceted	  complexities	  of	   familial	   and	   inter-­‐household	   relationships	   and	   the	   need	   for	   studies	   that	   encompass	  variables	  other	  than	  kinship,	  differences	  in	  production,	  and	  reciprocal	  food	  exchange	  (e.g.,	  Gurven	  and	  Hill,	  2010).	  	  In	  the	  current	  study,	  we	  observe	  transfers	  of	  meat	  over	  a	  yearlong	  period	  among	  25	  households	   in	   a	   community	   of	   indigenous	   Mayangna	   and	   Miskito	   horticulturalists	   in	  Nicaragua.	  The	  data	  are	  dyadic	  and	  have	  a	  “round-­‐robin	  design”	  whereby	  each	  household	  interacts	  with	  every	  other	  household	  in	  the	  community	  and	  where	  we	  observe	  the	  number	  of	   transfers	   given	   in	   each	   direction	  within	   each	   household	   dyad.	  We	   analyze	   these	   data	  using	   the	   social	   relations	   model	   (SRM)	   developed	   by	   Kenny	   and	   colleagues	   to	   separate	  individual	  effects	  from	  relationship	  effects	  in	  relational	  or	  dyadic	  data	  (Kenny,	  1994).	  The	  SRM	   decomposes	   the	   variance	   in	   a	   dyadic	   outcome	   into	   separate	   giving-­‐,	   receiving-­‐	   and	  relationship-­‐	   variance	   components,	   and	   allows	   for	   correlation	   in	   giving	   and	   receiving	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behaviors	   as	   well	   as	   for	   correlation	   of	   responses	   within	   a	   dyad.	   The	   SRM	   variance	   and	  covariance/correlation	   parameters	   are	   typically	   estimated	   by	   formulating	   the	   model	   as	  either	   a	   structural	   equation	  model	   or	   a	   multilevel	   model.	   Applied	   to	   our	   data,	   the	   SRM	  estimates	  the	  relative	  importance	  of	  households	  in	  their	  role	  as	  givers,	  households	  in	  their	  role	  as	  receivers,	  and	  unique	  relationship	  effects	  themselves	  as	  sources	  of	  variation	  in	  the	  number	  of	  portions	  of	  meat	  exchanged	  between	  households.	  In	  addition,	  the	  SRM	  estimates	  “generalized	  reciprocity”,	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  households	  in	  general	  reciprocate	  transfers,	  and	  “dyadic	  reciprocity”,	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  transfers	  are,	  on	  average,	  reciprocated	  within	  a	  dyad.	  Accessible	  introductions	  to	  the	  SRM	  and	  other	  models	  for	  dyadic	  data	  analysis	  are	  provided	  by	  Kashy	  and	  Donnellan	  (2012),	  Kenny	  and	  Kashy	  (2010),	  and	  Kenny,	  Kashy	  and	  Cook	  (2006).	  Van	  Duijn	  and	  Huisman	  (2011)	  provide	  an	  accessible	  review	  and	  comparison	  of	  the	  SRM	  to	  other	  statistical	  models	  for	  network	  data,	  including	  the	  Quadratic	  Assignment	  Procedure	  (QAP)	  and	  the	  p1	  and	  p2	  models.	  The	  SRM	  has	  been	  widely	  applied	  in	  social	  and	  behavioral	  research,	  especially	   in	  psychology	  (Back	  and	  Kenny	  2010).	  While	  evolutionary	  anthropologists	  have	  recently	  begun	  to	  implement	  multilevel	  modeling	  approaches	  for	  the	  analysis	  of	  network	  data	   (Allen-­‐Arave	  et	   al.,	   2008;	  Hooper,	  2011;	  MacFarlan	  et	   al.,	   2012;	  see	   also	   Gomes	   et	   al.,	   2009),	   we	   are	   not	   aware	   of	   any	   prior	   applications	   of	   the	   SRM	   to	  anthropological	  data	  from	  small-­‐scale	  societies.	  	  	   In	   this	   paper,	   we	   make	   two	   contributions,	   one	   substantive,	   the	   other	  methodological.	   First,	   we	   analyze	   inter-­‐household	   meat	   sharing	   among	   indigenous	  Nicaraguan	   horticulturalists	   as	   a	   function	   of	   multiple	   predictor	   variables,	   including	   an	  “association	  index,”	  which	  provides	  a	  measure	  of	  the	  amount	  of	  time	  that	  households	  are	  spending	   together	   and	   perhaps	   engaging	   in	   mutually	   beneficial	   activities.	   As	   a	   related	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objective,	   we	   assess	   how	   the	   generalized	   and	   dyadic	   reciprocity	   correlations	   and	   the	  observed	  variance	  in	  the	  data	  structure	  are	  explained	  by	  the	  covariates.	  Second,	  we	  extend	  the	  multilevel	  modeling	  formulation	  of	  the	  SRM	  to	  accommodate	  the	  count	  data	  nature	  of	  our	   response	  variable,	   and	  we	  describe	  how	   to	   fit	   this	  model	  using	  Bayesian	  methods	  as	  implemented	   in	   the	   free	  WinBUGS	   software	   (Lunn	  et	   al.,	   2000).	   Standard	   applications	  of	  the	   SRM	   are	   confined	   to	   the	   analysis	   of	   continuous	   responses,	   and	   so	   this	   extension	  represents	   a	   valuable	  approach	   for	   researchers	  with	  dyadic	   count	  data,	  whether	  on	   food	  sharing	  or	  other	  outcomes.	  The	  remainder	  of	  the	  paper	  is	  structured	  as	  follows.	  Section	  2	  discuses	  theories	  and	  predictors	  of	   food	  sharing.	  Section	  3	  presents	   the	  multilevel	  modeling	   formulation	  of	   the	  SRM	  for	  count	  data.	  Sections	  4	  and	  5	  introduce	  the	  data	  and	  describe	  the	  analysis.	  Sections	  6	  and	  7	  present	  and	  discuss	  the	  results.	  Section	  8	  concludes.	  	  
2.	  Theories	  and	  predictors	  of	  food	  sharing	  
2.1.	  Evolutionary	  models	  and	  predictions	  	   Among	  humans,	  but	  also	  other	  animals,	  food	  sharing	  and	  cooperation	  more	  broadly	  may	  reflect	  kin	  selection	  (the	  evolutionary	  strategy	  of	  favoring	  the	  reproductive	  success	  of	  one’s	   relatives,	   even	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   one’s	   own	   survival	   and	   reproduction).	   This	  evolutionary	  model	  extends	  conventional	  understandings	  of	  natural	   selection	   to	  consider	  the	  effects	  of	  an	  individual’s	  behavior	  on	  the	  evolutionary	  fitness	  (cumulative	  reproductive	  success)	  of	   their	  kin	   (Hamilton,	  1964).	   In	  other	  words,	  even	   though	  relinquishing	   food	   is	  costly,	   the	   evolutionary	   benefits	   of	   sharing	   with	   relatives	   at	   the	   allelic	   level	   can	   be	  recouped	   via	   the	   reproductive	   success	   of	   genetically	   similar	   recipients.	   Hamilton’s	   Rule	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(Hamilton,	   1964)	   indicates	   that	   kin	   selection	   can	   occur	   when	  𝑏×𝑟   >   𝑐,	   where	  𝑏	  is	   the	  fitness	   benefit	   to	   the	   receiver,	  𝑐	  is	   the	   cost	   to	   the	   giver,	   and	  𝑟	  is	   Wright’s	   coefficient	   of	  genetic	  relatedness	  (Wright,	  1922),	  or	  the	  likelihood	  of	  sharing	  alleles	  by	  common	  descent.	  Assuming	   that	   benefits	   and	   costs	   are	   held	   constant,	   Hamilton’s	   Rule	   predicts	   greater	  altruism	  and	  cooperation	  among	  close	  genetic	  kin,	  such	  as	  the	  parents,	  offspring,	  and	  full	  siblings	  of	  the	  giver,	  than	  among	  more	  distantly	  related	  kin	  or	  unrelated	  individuals.	  	  	   Natural	   selection	   can	   also	   favor	   transfers	   of	   food	   between	   unrelated	   individuals,	  particularly	   if	   partners	   enter	   reciprocal	   relationships	   in	  which	   they	   alternately	   exchange	  food	   (Trivers,	   1971).	   Considering	   the	   unpredictability	   with	   which	   human	   foragers	  successfully	  acquire	   fish	  and	  game,	   reciprocal	   sharing	  of	  meat	   can	   reduce	   the	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  variability	  of	  available	  meat	  for	  such	  partners	  (Winterhalder,	  1986).	  A	  positive	  correlation	  between	  the	  bidirectional	  flows	  within	  a	  dyad,	  generally	  known	  as	  “contingency,”	  provides	  empirical	  support	  for	  the	  evolutionary	  model	  of	  reciprocal	  altruism	  (Gurven,	  2004).	  Owing	  to	   the	   costs	   of	   unreciprocated	   transfers,	   humans	   may	   possess	   evolved	   psychological	  mechanisms	   that	   facilitate	   the	   detection	   of	   cheaters	   and	   “free-­‐riders”	   (Cosmides	   et	   al.,	  2010).	  	   Especially	  for	  foods	  that	  cannot	  be	  stored	  for	  long	  periods	  of	  time,	  such	  as	  meat	  in	  tropical	   settings,	   resources	   exhibit	   diminishing	  marginal	   valuation	   (Winterhalder,	   1996).	  Whereas	   the	   first	   portion	   of	   a	   harvest	   may	   provide	   essential	   nutrients,	   the	   value	   of	  additional	   consumption	   declines	   as	   needs	   are	  met	   and	   physiological	   constraints	   prevent	  individuals	   from	   obtaining	   further	   nutritional	   benefits.	   Such	   differences	   in	   the	   marginal	  valuation	   of	   portions	   can	   promote	   kin	   selection	   and	   reciprocal	   altruism,	   as	   sated	  individuals	  donate	  remaining	  portions	  to	  kin	  or	  reliable	  partners.	  Possessors	  of	  food	  might	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also	  relinquish	  portions	   to	  “scroungers”	   if	   the	  cost	  of	  defending	   the	  resource	  exceeds	   the	  expected	   marginal	   value	   of	   retaining	   it.	   This	   evolutionary	   model,	   known	   as	   tolerated	  
scrounging,	   predicts	   transfers	   according	   to	   differences	   in	   need	  with	   little	   expectation	   of	  subsequent	  benefits	  for	  the	  original	  possessor.	  Notably,	  the	  opportunity	  to	  sell	  portions	  of	  meat	  may	  attenuate	  the	  diminishing	  value	  of	  large	  resources	  and	  reduce	  the	  prevalence	  of	  tolerated	  scrounging	  (Gurven,	  2004).	  	   Another	  evolutionary	  model,	  costly	  signaling	  theory,	  suggests	  that	  possessors	  of	  food	  share	  widely	  in	  order	  to	  convey	  information	  about	  their	  traits,	  including	  their	  generosity	  or	  their	   ability	   to	   obtain	   (and	   waste)	   resources	   (Bliege	   Bird	   and	   Smith,	   2005).	   This	  information	  benefits	  observers,	  who	  can	  subsequently	  choose	  the	  best	  available	  mates	  and	  allies,	  which	  in	  turn	  benefits	  the	  original	  signalers.	  Although	  the	  evolutionary	  logic	  of	  costly	  signaling	   theory	   is	   generally	   accepted,	   empirical	   tests	   remain	   challenging	   because	   of	   the	  need	   to	   satisfy	  multiple	   conditions	   of	   the	   theory	  while	   ruling	   out	   alternative	   hypotheses	  (Smith	  and	  Bliege	  Bird,	  2000).	  	  
2.2.	  Association	  indices	  as	  a	  predictor	  of	  food	  sharing	  
	   Evolutionary	  anthropologists	  recognize	  that	  food	  can	  be	  “traded”	  for	  other	  fitness-­‐enhancing	  currencies,	  such	  as	  childcare,	  political	  support,	  reproductive	  opportunities,	  help	  with	  agricultural	   labor,	  or	  other	  needed	  goods	  and	  services	  (Winterhalder,	  1996;	  Gurven,	  2004;	  Patton,	  2005;	  Nolin,	  2012).	  Within	  cooperative	  groups,	  including	  households	  as	  well	  as	  broader	  groupings,	  the	  trading	  of	  foods	  for	  other	  currencies	  may	  promote	  specialization	  that	  promotes	  group-­‐level	  efficiency	  by	  allocating	  tasks	  to	  the	  most	  productive	  individuals	  (Gurven,	   2004).	   Such	   considerations	   rarely	   receive	   formal	   attention,	   however,	   primarily	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owing	   to	   the	   challenge	   of	   determining	   the	   relative	   costs	   and	   benefits	   of	   each	   currency	  (Winterhalder,	  1996).	  	   In	  addition	  to	  scenarios	  where	  trades	  between	  households	  are	  implicit,	   individuals	  in	   small-­‐scale	   societies	   cooperate	   in	  multiple,	   beneficial	  ways.	   For	   example,	  women	  may	  forage	  together,	  exchanging	  their	  insights	  about	  the	  locations	  of	  food	  and	  boosting	  overall	  productivity	   while	   also	   providing	   emergency	   assistance	   and	   defending	   each	   other	   from	  external	  threats	  (Marlowe,	  2010).	  Within	  the	  community,	  people	  share	  tools,	  build	  houses	  together,	   teach	   each	   other	   skills,	   jointly	   care	   for	   livestock,	   and	   treat	   others’	   illnesses.	   In	  some	  cases,	   such	   favors	  entail	   specific	   expectations	  of	   repayment	   (i.e.,	   trade),	  but	  among	  close	   associates,	   these	   interactions	   largely	   reflect	   a	   broader	   commitment	   to	   ongoing	  relationships	  in	  which	  there	  is	  no	  clear	  record	  of	  debts	  and	  credits.	  	   The	  analysis	  in	  this	  paper	  hinges	  on	  the	  idea	  that	  these	  multifaceted	  inter-­‐household	  relationships	   provide	   the	   social	   context	   in	   which	   food	   sharing	   occurs.	   Furthermore,	   we	  assert	   that	   the	   strength	   of	   such	   relationships	   is	   reflected	   by	   the	   amount	   of	   time	   that	  households	   spend	   in	   each	   other’s	   company.	   Time	   spent	   together,	   as	   measured	   by	   an	  
association	   index	   (Cairns	   and	   Schwager,	   1987),	   is	   not	   necessarily	   a	   causal	   variable	   itself.	  Instead,	   because	   cooperation	   between	   individuals	   and	   households	   frequently	   requires	  direct	   interaction,	   the	   association	   index	   serves	   as	   a	   proxy	   for	   the	   multifaceted	  interdependencies	  that	  characterize	  those	  relationships.	  	   In	  prior	  studies	  of	  food	  sharing	  in	  human	  societies,	  association	  indices	  have	  received	  scant	   consideration	   as	   predictor	   variables.	   This	   inattention	   is	   surprising	   given	   that	  Wilkinson’s	   (1984)	   classic	   study	   of	   reciprocal	   blood	   regurgitation	   among	   vampire	   bats	  shows	  that	  past	  association	  significantly	  predicts	  sharing	  even	  after	  controlling	  for	  genetic	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relatedness.	   Similar	   effects	   are	   evident	   among	   unrelated	   female	   hyenas,	   which	   show	  greater	   tolerance	   toward	   frequent	  associates	  at	   feeding	   sites	   (Smith	  et	   al.,	   2007).	  Among	  non-­‐human	  primates,	  affiliative	  relationships	  and	  association	  predict	   food	  sharing	  among	  spider	  monkeys	  (Pastor-­‐Nieto,	  2001)	  and	  chimpanzees	  (de	  Waal,	  1989;	  Mitani,	  2006;	  Silk	  et	  al.,	  2013;	  cf.	  Gilby,	  2006;	  see	  also	  Jaeggi	  et	  al.,	  2010)	  while	  controlling	  for	  kinship.1	  	   Among	  human	  ecologists,	  Gurven	  et	  al.	  (2004)	  provide	  perhaps	  the	  only	  analysis	  to	  consider	  the	  relationship	  between	  association	  and	  food	  sharing.	  Their	  report	  indicates	  that,	  among	  the	  Ache	  of	  Paraguay,	  there	  is	  a	  correlation	  between	  food	  sharing	  in	  the	  community	  and	   the	   percentage	   of	   time	   that	  men	   spend	   foraging	   together	   in	   the	   forest.	   Because	   the	  correlation	  is	  limited	  to	  food	  acquired	  in	  the	  forest	  and	  foraging	  expeditions	  by	  adult	  men,	  however,	   it	   is	   not	   clear	   that	   a	   similar	   effect	  would	   be	   apparent	  when	   considering	   other	  aspects	  of	  cooperative	  relationships	  and	  interactions	  between	  households.	  
	  
3.	  Multilevel	  social	  relations	  model	  for	  count	  data	  Consider	   the	   number	   of	   gifts	   that	   Household	   A	   gives	   to	   Household	   B.	   The	   SRM	  would	  decompose	  this	  number	  into	  four	  components:	  (1)	  the	  overall	  mean	  number	  of	  gifts	  given	   between	   households;	   (2)	   Household	   A’s	   giver	   effect,	   measuring	   how	   the	   mean	  number	  of	  gifts	  Household	  A	  gives	  to	  the	  other	  households	  in	  the	  village	  deviates	  from	  the	  overall	  mean;	  (3)	  Household	  B’s	  receiver	  effect,	  measuring	  how	  the	  mean	  number	  of	  gifts	  Household	  B	   receives	   from	   the	   other	   households	   in	   the	   village	  deviates	   from	   the	   overall	  mean;	   and	   (4)	  Household	  A	   and	  B’s	  unique	   relationship	   effect,	  measuring	   the	  number	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  de	   Waal	   (2000)	   highlights	   the	   need	   to	   control	   for	   association	   indices	   to	   avoid	   spurious	   evidence	   for	  reciprocity.	  See	  Hawkes	  et	  al.	  (2010)	  for	  a	  similar	  discussion,	  but	  note	  Gurven	  and	  Hill’s	  (2010)	  observation	  that	  the	  decision	  to	  co-­‐reside	  or	  spend	  time	  together	  is	  itself	  a	  choice	  that	  could	  be	  considered	  a	  prerequisite	  to	  sharing.	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gifts	  that	  Household	  A	  gives	  to	  Household	  B,	  over	  and	  above	  that	  suggested	  by	  the	  overall	  mean	   and	   Household	   A’s	   giver	   effect	   and	   Household	   B’s	   receiver	   effect.	   Conversely,	   the	  number	   of	   gifts	   which	   Household	   B	   gives	   Household	   A	   would	   be	   decomposed	   into	   the	  overall	   mean,	   Household	   B’s	   giver	   effect,	   Household	   A’s	   receiver	   effect,	   and	   a	   unique	  relationship	  effect	   from	  Household	  B	  to	  Household	  A.	  The	  variances	  of	  the	  giver,	  receiver	  and	   relationship	   effects	   quantify	   the	   relative	   importance	   of	   households	   as	   givers,	  households	  as	  receivers,	  and	  of	  the	  unique	  relationships	  themselves	  as	  explanations	  for	  the	  observed	  variance	   in	   food	  giving	  between	  households.	  The	  correlation	  between	   the	  giver	  and	   receiver	   effects	   provides	   a	  measure	   of	   generalized	   reciprocity:	   the	   degree	   to	   which	  food	   sharing	   is	   in	   general	   reciprocated	   (see	  Gurven,	   2004).	   The	   correlation	   between	   the	  two	   unique	   relationship	   effects	   is	   a	   measure	   of	   dyadic	   reciprocity:	   the	   degree	   to	   which	  excess	  food	  sharing	  is	  reciprocated	  within	  household	  dyads.	  That	  is,	  the	  dyadic	  reciprocity	  correlation	  indicates	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  a	  household	  that	  gives	  an	  especially	  high	  number	  of	  gifts	  to	  another	  household	  experiences	  in	  return	  an	  especially	  high	  number	  of	  gifts	  from	  that	  household	  after	  accounting	   for	  households’	  general	  giving	  and	  receiving	  tendencies.2	  Thus,	   the	   SRM’s	   dyadic	   reciprocity	   correlation	   differs	   in	   interpretation	   as	   well	   as	  calculation	  from	  the	  simple	  unconditional	  pairwise	  correlation	  one	  might	  calculate	  on	  the	  raw	  data.	  	  Snijders	   and	   Kenny	   (1999)	   propose	   multilevel	   modeling	   (Goldstein,	   2011;	  Raudenbush	  and	  Bryk,	  2002;	  Snijders	  and	  Bosker,	  2012)	  as	  a	  natural	  statistical	  approach	  for	  estimating	   the	  variance	  and	  covariance	  parameters	  of	   the	  SRM	  and	   they	  demonstrate	  how	   to	   do	   this	   using	   the	  MLwiN	   software	   (Rasbash	   et	   al.,	   2009).	   Kenny	   and	   Livi	   (2009)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Note	  that	  while	  we	  expect	  to	  find	  positive	  dyadic	  reciprocity,	  the	  correlation	  is	  allowed	  to	  range	  from	  -­‐1	  to	  1	  and	  so	  is	  equally	  able	  to	  detect	  negative	  dyadic	  reciprocity.	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show	  how	  the	  same	  multilevel	   formulation	  can	  be	   implemented	   in	   the	  SAS	  (SAS	  Institute	  Inc.,	   2012)	   and	   SPSS	   software	   (IBM	  Corp,	   2012).	  However,	   the	  models	   they	   propose	   are	  limited	  to	  the	  analysis	  of	  continuous	  response	  data	  while	  our	  response	  variable	  is	  a	  count.	  In	   contrast,	   Hoff	   (2005)	   shows	   how	   the	   SRM	   for	   binary	   and	   count	   responses	   can	   be	  formulated	  as	  multilevel	  logistic	  and	  Poisson	  models,	  and	  it	  is	  the	  latter	  approach	  that	  we	  pursue	  in	  this	  paper.	  We	  note	  that	  Hoff	  also	  proposes	  an	  extension	  to	  the	  SRM	  to	  allow	  for	  limited	   forms	   of	   triadic	   dependence	   (transitivity	   effects),	   but	   we	   do	   not	   pursue	   this	  extension	  in	  the	  current	  study.	  Like	  Hoff,	  we	  employ	  a	  Bayesian	  approach	  to	  estimate	  the	  parameters	  of	  the	  SRM	  (see	  Section	  5.4).	  Let	  𝑦!" 	  denote	   the	   total	   number	   of	   gifts	   given	   by	   household	  𝑖 	  (𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑁 )	   to	  household	  𝑗	  (𝑗 = 1,… ,𝑁)	   over	   the	   course	   of	   the	   yearlong	   study.	   We	   model	   this	   count	  outcome	  as	  Poisson	  distributed	  	  	   𝑦!"~Poisson 𝜇!" ,	   (1)	  where	  𝜇!" 	  denotes	   the	   expected	   number	   of	   gifts	   given	   from	   household	  𝑖	  to	   household	  𝑗.	  Thus,	   the	   error	   in	   this	   model	   is	   the	   deviation	   of	   the	   observed	   count	   from	   the	   expected	  count,	  𝑦!! − 𝜇!" .	  We	  specify	  the	  SRM	  for	  𝜇!" 	  as	  the	  following	  log-­‐linear	  model	  	   log 𝜇!" = 𝛽! + 𝑔! + 𝑟! + 𝑑!" ,	   (2)	  where,	   for	   simplicity,	   we	   present	   the	   “intercept-­‐only”	   (“null”	   or	   “empty”)	   version	   of	   the	  model	  with	  no	  covariates.3	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Note	  that	  equation	  2	  is	  specified	  in	  terms	  of	  𝜇!" 	  not	  𝑦!";	  we	  are	  not	  attempting	  to	  log	  transform	  a	  variable	  containing	  zeros.	  The	  model	  assumes	  there	  is	  a	  non-­‐zero	  probability	  of	  gift	  giving	  between	  each	  pair	  of	  households	  in	  the	  data	  and	  so	  the	  expected	  counts	  for	  all	  pairs	  will	  exceed	  zero.	  If	  we	  were	  instead	  to	  believe	  that	  there	  was	  a	  truly	  zero	  probability	  of	  trade	  between	  some	  dyads,	  as	  in	  large	  networks,	  then	  we	  could	  in	  theory	  test	  this	  hypothesis	  by	  modeling	  the	  counts	  as	  following	  instead	  a	  zero-­‐inflated	  Poisson	  process,	  but	  this	  is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  current	  paper.	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The	  intercept	  parameter,	  𝛽!,	  measures	  the	  average	  logged	  expected	  number	  of	  gifts	  given	   by	   household	  𝑖	  to	   household	  𝑗,	  𝑔! 	  is	   a	   household-­‐level	   giver	   random	   effect	   which,	  when	   added	   to	  𝛽! ,	   measures	   the	   average	   logged	   expected	   number	   of	   gifts	   given	   by	  household	  𝑖	  to	  other	  households	  in	  the	  community,	  𝑟! 	  is	  a	  household-­‐level	  receiver	  random	  effect	   which,	   when	   added	   to	  𝛽!,	   measures	   the	   average	   logged	   expected	   number	   of	   gifts	  received	  by	  household	  𝑗	  from	  other	  households	   in	   the	   community,	   and	  𝑑!" 	  is	   a	   dyad-­‐level	  relationship	  random	  effect	  which	  measures	   the	   logged	  expected	  number	  of	  gifts	  given	  by	  household	  𝑖	  to	   household	  𝑗	  above	   and	  beyond	   that	   predicted	  by	  household	  𝑖’s	   giver	   effect	  and	  household	  𝑗’s	  receiver	  effect.	  Substantive	  interest	  lies	  in	  estimating	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  these	  different	  random	  effects	  vary	  and	  covary	  across	  households,	  as	  opposed	  to	  predicting	  values	   for	   the	   different	   random	   effects	   for	   any	   pair	   of	   households.	   The	   household-­‐level	  giver	   and	   receiver	   random	   effects,	  𝑔! 	  and	  𝑟! ,	   are	   assumed	   bivariate	   normally	   distributed	  with	  zero	  means	  and	  homogenous	  2×2	  giver-­‐receiver	  covariance	  matrix	  
	   𝑔!𝑟! ~N 00 , 𝜎!!𝜎!" 𝜎!! 	  ,	   (3)	  where	   𝜎!! 	  measures	   the	   giver	   variance,	   𝜎!! 	  measures	   the	   receiver	   variance,	   and	   𝜎!" 	  measures	   the	   giver-­‐receiver	   covariance.	   The	   corresponding	   giver-­‐receiver	   correlation,	  𝜌!" = 𝜎!" 𝜎!!𝜎!!,	  measures	  the	  degree	  of	  generalized	  reciprocity	  in	  the	  community.	  	  The	   dyad-­‐level	   relationship	   random	   effects,	  𝑑!" 	  and	  𝑑!" ,	   are	   assumed	   bivariate	  normally	   distributed	   with	   zero	   means	   and	   homogenous	  2×2 	  relationship	   covariance	  matrix	  
	   𝑑!"𝑑!" ~N 00 , 𝜎!!𝜎!! 𝜎!!   ,	   (4)	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where	  𝜎!! 	  measures	   the	   relationship	   variance;	   and	  𝜎!! 	  measures	   the	   covariance.	   The	  corresponding	   correlation,	   𝜌!! = 𝜎!! 𝜎!! ,	   measures	   the	   average	   degree	   of	   dyadic	  reciprocity	  in	  the	  community.	  The	   relative	   importance	   of	   giver,	   receiver	   and	   relationship	   random	   effects	   as	  sources	  of	  variation	  in	  gift	  giving	  can	  be	  summarized	  by	  dividing	  each	  estimated	  variance	  by	   the	   total	   of	   the	   three	   estimated	   variances.	   These	   statistics	   are	   referred	   to	   in	   the	  multilevel	   modeling	   literature	   as	   variance	   partition	   coefficients	   (VPC,	   Goldstein	   et	   al.,	  2002).	  A	   complication	  which	   arises	   in	   the	   current	   study	   is	   that	   not	   all	   households	  were	  present	   for	   the	   full	   duration	   of	   the	   yearlong	   study.	  We	   account	   for	   the	   variation	   in	   the	  proportion	  of	  the	  year	  for	  which	  both	  members	  of	  each	  dyad	  were	  simultaneously	  present	  in	   the	   community	   by	   entering	   the	   natural	   logarithm	   of	   this	   exposure	   as	   an	   offset	   in	   the	  model	   (a	   covariate	   with	   coefficient	   constrained	   to	   equal	   a	   value	   of	   one).	   This	   is	  mathematically	   equivalent	   to	   dividing	   the	   expected	   count	   in	   (2)	   by	   the	   exposure.	  Conceptually	   this	  modification	  allows	  us	   to	  model	   the	  expected	  number	  of	   gifts	  per	  year,	  rather	   than	   the	   expected	   number	   of	   gifts	   per	   period	   that	   each	   pair	   of	   households	   was	  
present.	  The	  former	  is	  more	  directly	  interpretable.	  	  The	   above	  model	   can	   be	   extended	  by	   including	   household-­‐level	   covariates	   to	   test	  hypotheses	   as	   to	   why	   some	   households	   generally	   give	   or	   receive	   more	   than	   other	  households.	  Note	  that	  attributes	  of	  the	  households,	  such	  as	  the	  amount	  of	  hunted	  game	  that	  they	  harvest,	  can	  enter	  the	  model	  twice	  in	  order	  to	  serve	  as	  a	  predictor	  of	  both	  giving	  and	  receiving.	   Entering	   dyad-­‐level	   covariates	   enable	   us	   to	   test	   hypotheses	   as	   to	   why	   some	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dyads	   share	   more	   than	   predicted	   by	   their	   general	   household-­‐level	   giving	   and	   receiving	  tendencies.	  Dyad-­‐level	  covariates	  may	  be	  symmetric,	  𝑥!" = 𝑥!" ,	  or	  non-­‐symmetric,	  𝑥!" ≠ 𝑥!" .	  
	  
4.	  Study	  site	  	   The	   data	   were	   collected	   during	   a	   yearlong	   study	   in	   Arang	   Dak,	   a	   community	   of	  indigenous	   Mayangna	   and	   Miskito	   horticulturalists	   in	   Nicaragua’s	   Bosawas	   Biosphere	  Reserve.4	  At	   the	   time	  of	   the	  study	   (2004-­‐2005),	   there	  were	  approximately	  200	  residents,	  distributed	  among	  25	  households.	  Partly	  owing	  to	  the	  influence	  of	  missionaries	  in	  the	  early	  twentieth	  century,	  the	  Mayangna	  and	  Miskito	  have	  prescriptively	  monogamous	  marriages	  and	   a	   bilateral	   kinship	   system	   that	   traces	   descent	   through	   both	   mothers	   and	   fathers	  (Helms,	  1971).5	  Households	  are	  primarily	  comprised	  of	  married	  household	  heads	  and	  their	  offspring,	   sometimes	  accompanied	  by	  extended	  kin,	   including	  widowed	  parents	  of	   either	  household	  head.	  Although	  there	  are	  no	  clear	  postmarital	  residence	  rules,	  it	  is	  common	  for	  young	  couples	  to	  live	  with	  the	  woman’s	  parents	  until	  they	  have	  at	  least	  one	  child.	  Divorces	  among	  young	   couples	  occur	   frequently,	   in	  which	   case	   the	  woman	  and	  offspring	   typically	  remain	  with	  her	  parents	  after	  the	  man	  departs.	  When	  building	  a	  new	  house,	  couples	  often	  select	  locations	  that	  are	  close	  to	  the	  domiciles	  of	  other	  close	  kin	  in	  the	  community.	  	   Dietary	  staples	  include	  cultivated	  crops	  like	  bananas,	  plantains,	  manioc,	  yams,	  rice,	  beans,	   and	   maize.	   Much	   of	   the	   protein	   in	   the	   diet	   comes	   from	   animal-­‐based	   products.	  During	   the	   study	   period,	   hunted	  meat	  was	   the	   leading	   source	   of	   dietary	   protein	   overall	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  At	   the	   time	   of	   the	   study,	   at	   least	   one	   household	   head	   in	   each	   household	   in	   Arang	   Dak	   self-­‐identified	   as	  Mayangna.	   Comparative	   studies	   reveal	   few	   noteworthy	   differences	   in	   the	   subsistence	   strategies	   of	   the	  Mayangna	  and	  Miskito	  (Stocks,	  1998).	  5	  Bilateral	  kinship	  contrasts	  with	  a	  unilineal	  descent	  system,	  in	  which	  kin	  groups	  are	  formed	  and	  recognized	  according	   to	   descent	   exclusively	   from	   either	   the	   father’s	   line	   (patrilineal	   descent)	   or	   the	   mother’s	   line	  (matrilineal	  descent).	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(Koster,	   2007),	   but	   whereas	   hunting	   is	   generally	   limited	   to	   a	   few	   highly	   productive	  households,	   fishing	   is	  a	  common	  strategy	   for	  virtually	  all	  households.	  The	  Mayangna	  and	  Miskito	   also	   keep	   livestock,	   including	   cattle,	   pigs,	   and	   fowl.	   Cows	   primarily	   serve	   as	   an	  exchangeable	   store	   of	   wealth,	   occasionally	   sold	   to	   itinerant	   merchants,	   and	   they	   are	  slaughtered	  within	   the	   community	   only	   under	   unusual	   circumstances.	   Pigs	   and	   fowl,	   by	  contrast,	   are	  primarily	   for	   consumption.	  Cows	  and	  chickens	  are	  also	   sources	  of	  milk	  and	  eggs,	  respectively,	  but	  these	  animal	  by-­‐products	  are	  secondary	  foods	  in	  this	  setting.	  	   Other	  anthropologists	  have	   commented	  on	   the	   food	   sharing	  norms	  of	   the	  Miskito.	  Nietschmann	  (1973)	  notes	  that	  meat	  is	  shared	  more	  widely	  than	  cultivated	  crops,	  which	  is	  a	   common	   cross-­‐cultural	   pattern	   (Gurven,	   2004).	   Both	   Nietschmann	   (1973)	   and	   Helms	  (1971)	   indicate	   that	   close	   kin	   are	   the	   primary	   recipients	   of	   shared	   food,	   with	   special	  emphasis	   on	   mothers,	   followed	   by	   married	   offspring,	   siblings,	   and	   aunts.	   Reflecting	   the	  importance	  of	  the	  church	  in	  community	  life,	  residents	  also	  donate	  food	  to	  the	  communities’	  pastors	   (Helms,	   1971),	   who	   are	   typically	   local	   men	   with	   little	   formal	   religious	   training	  outside	   of	   periodic	   participation	   in	   territory-­‐wide	   workshops	   and	   gatherings.	   Helms	  (1971)	   also	   credits	   the	   Christian	   influence	   and	   an	   ethic	   of	   generosity	   for	   the	   charitable	  support	  of	  the	  poorest	  households	  in	  the	  community.	  More	  generally,	  Nietschmann	  (1973)	  describes	  a	  redistributive	  system	  in	  which	  the	  most	  productive	  hunters	  and	  fishermen	  give	  away	  considerably	  more	  than	  they	  receive	  over	  intermediate	  periods	  of	  time.	  	  
5.	  Methods	  and	  analysis	  
5.1.	  Data	  collection	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   Throughout	   the	   study	   period,	   local	   research	   assistants	   worked	   with	   female	  household	  heads	  every	  morning	  to	  document	  the	  acquisition	  and	  consumption	  of	  animal-­‐based	   foods,	   including	  meat,	  eggs,	  and	  milk.	  When	  such	   foods	  had	  been	  consumed	   in	   the	  previous	  24	  hours,	  the	  assistants	  recorded	  whether	  it	  was	  produced	  by	  a	  member	  of	  that	  household	  or	  whether	  it	  was	  a	  purchase	  or	  a	  gift	  and	  the	  identity	  of	  the	  provider.	  Each	  time	  a	   resource	   was	   consumed,	   it	   was	   documented	   as	   a	   “portion”	   (analogous	   to	   the	  “consumption	   events”	   of	   Kaplan	   and	   Hill,	   1985).	   For	   purchases,	   Nicaraguan	   currency	   is	  often	  the	  unit	  of	  exchanges,	  but	  purchases	  can	  also	  be	  made	  via	  bartered	  goods	  or	  services.	  In	   this	   paper,	   we	   focus	   only	   on	   gifted	   foods,	   which	   entail	   no	   immediate	   and	   specific	  expectations	  of	  exchange	  or	  reciprocity.	  	   The	  aforementioned	  animal	  products	  vary	  in	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  portions	  are	  gifted,	  sold,	  or	  retained	  by	  the	  possessing	  household	  (Fig.	  1).	  For	  example,	  more	  than	  half	  of	  the	  consumed	   portions	   of	   hunted	   game	   were	   received	   as	   gifts	   from	   other	   households.	   By	  contrast,	  only	  21%	  of	  the	  portions	  of	  fish	  were	  received	  as	  gifts.	  Such	  differences	  probably	  reflect	  variation	  in	  the	  “package	  size”	  of	  the	  respective	  resources,	  as	  the	  marginal	  valuation	  promotes	   the	  apportionment	  and	  distribution	  of	   large	   items	  (Tucker,	  2004).6	  Also,	  unlike	  hunting,	  fishing	  returns	  are	  seasonally	  predictable,	  which	  depresses	  the	  benefits	  of	  sharing	  (or	  scrounging)	  because	  households	  tend	  to	  have	  similar	  amounts	  of	  harvested	  fish	  at	  any	  particular	  time	  (see	  Winterhalder,	  1996).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Relative	   to	   hunted	   game,	   proportionally	   fewer	   portions	   of	   pork	   are	   retained	   by	   the	   household	   that	  slaughtered	   the	  pig.	  One	   important	  difference	  between	   these	  resources	   is	   that,	  whereas	  only	  adult	  pigs	  are	  routinely	  slaughtered,	  there	  is	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  harvested	  game	  species	  that	  vary	  in	  size	  (Koster,	  2008a).	  It	  is	  reasonably	   clear	   that	   smaller	   game	   animals	   are	   more	   likely	   to	   be	   consumed	   entirely	   by	   the	   acquiring	  household.	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   Other	   methods	   result	   in	   complementary	   data.	   For	   approximately	   one	   week	   per	  month,	   the	   lead	   author	   used	   the	   “spot	   check”	   observational	   method	   to	   document	   the	  behavior	  of	  residents	  (Koster	  et	  al.,	  2013).	  This	  method	  entails	  unannounced	  and	  randomly	  scheduled	   observations	   of	   households,	   during	   which	   the	   activities	   and	   locations	   of	   all	  residents	   are	   recorded	   (Borgerhoff	   Mulder	   and	   Caro,	   1985).	   In	   this	   study,	   observations	  occurred	  on	  82	  days	  between	  5:30	  AM	  and	  6:00	  PM,	  and	  households	  were	  sampled	  without	  replacement	  such	  that	  all	  households	  were	  sampled	  exactly	  once	  per	  day	  (see	  Koster	  et	  al.,	  2013).	   During	   the	   observations,	   the	   interactions	   of	   household	   members	   with	   any	   other	  person	   in	   the	   community	  were	   recorded.	   For	   example,	   if	   the	  male	   household	   head	   from	  Household	  A	  was	   fishing	  with	   an	   adolescent	  boy	   from	  Household	  B,	   this	   interaction	  was	  documented.	   These	   observed	   interactions	   provide	   the	   basis	   for	   an	   inter-­‐household	  association	  index	  (see	  below).	  	   Periodic	   censuses	  of	   the	   community	   throughout	   the	   study	  period	  provide	  data	  on	  livestock	  ownership.	  For	  the	  duration	  of	  the	  project,	  local	  research	  assistants	  documented	  the	  harvest	  of	  fish	  and	  game	  by	  all	  members	  of	  the	  community	  (Koster,	  2008b).	  Informant	  rankings	  on	  an	  ordinal	  scale	  were	  used	  to	  calculate	  a	  weighted	  average	  of	  each	  household’s	  wealth,	   which	   is	   correlated	   with	   household	   ownership	   of	   material	   possessions	   (Koster,	  2011a).	  Genealogical	   interviews	  were	  used	  to	  calculate	  the	  purported	  genetic	  relatedness	  of	  all	   residents.	  A	  GPS	  unit	  was	  used	  to	  map	  the	   locations	  of	  households,	   thus	   facilitating	  the	  calculation	  of	   inter-­‐household	  distance,	  which	  ranges	  from	  17	  to	  357	  meters	  (mean	  =	  122	  meters).	  
	  
5.2	  Calculation	  of	  the	  association	  index	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   We	  used	  the	  spot	  check	  observational	  data	  to	  create	  an	  inter-­‐household	  “association	  index”	   (Cairns	   and	   Schwager,	   1987).	  We	   summed	   all	   of	   the	   times	   in	  which	   a	  member	   of	  Household	   A	   was	   observed	   interacting	   with	   Household	   B,	   which	   produces	   a	   valued	  symmetric	   matrix.	   Largely	   because	   of	   differences	   in	   household	   size,	   we	   normalized	   the	  matrix	   using	   an	   iterative	   process	   in	   UCINET	   (Borgatti	   et	   al.,	   2002).	   This	   normalization	  ensures	   that	   the	  marginal	   sums	  of	  all	   rows	  and	  columns	  are	  approximately	  equal	   to	  one,	  thereby	  giving	  all	  nodes	  “equal	  weight”	  (Hanneman	  and	  Riddle,	  2005;	  see	  Alvard,	  2003	  for	  a	  similar	  application	  of	  this	  normalization	  procedure).	  	  
5.3.	  Modeling	  strategy,	  covariates,	  and	  predictions	  	   Our	  foremost	  interest	  lies	  in	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  association	  index,	  but	  to	  avoid	  spurious	  interpretations,	   we	   include	   a	   broader	   suite	   of	   covariates	   (i.e.,	   “fixed	   effects”)	   that	   are	  likewise	  expected	  to	  account	  for	  variation	  in	  meat	  sharing	  (see	  Table	  1	  for	  descriptions	  and	  summary	   statistics).	   These	   covariates	   include	   variables	   that	   are	   routinely	   included	   in	  studies	   of	   food	   sharing,	   such	   as	   kinship	   and	   inter-­‐household	   distance.	   Other	   predictors	  reflect	  attributes	  and	  relationships	  that	  have	  been	  noted	  in	  the	  ethnographic	  literature	  on	  food	  sharing	  in	  lowland	  Nicaragua.	  	   Some	  covariates	  are	  household-­‐level	  attributes,	  referring	  to	  characteristics	  of	  either	  the	  giving	  household	  or	  the	  receiving	  household.	  Other	  covariates	  are	  dyadic	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  refer	  to	  the	  relationships	  between	  household	  pairs,	  such	  as	   inter-­‐household	  kin	  relations,	  distance,	  or	  the	  association	  index.7	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  In	  studies	  of	   food	  sharing,	  dyadic	  variables	  tend	  to	  be	  symmetric,	  such	  that	  the	  value	  of	   the	  variable	   from	  household	  A	  to	  B	  equals	  the	  value	  from	  household	  B	  to	  A.	  Our	  dyadic	  variables	  for	  kinship	  are	  symmetric,	  for	  example.	   As	   noted	   previously,	   however,	   asymmetric	   variables	   could	   also	   be	   included.	   For	   example,	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   Like	   Nolin	   (2010),	   we	   include	   distance	   primarily	   as	   a	   control	   variable,	   with	   the	  expectation	   that	   transfers	   will	   decrease	   with	   increasing	   distance	   between	   households.	  	  Because	   these	  distances	  exhibit	  positive	  skew,	   this	  variable	  was	   log-­‐transformed	  prior	   to	  analysis.	  	   Transfers	   are	   expected	   to	   be	   higher	   between	   households	   that	   are	   more	   closely	  related.	   We	   characterize	   the	   kin-­‐based	   relationship	   between	   households	   using	   the	  coefficient	   of	   relatedness,	  𝑟,	   associated	   with	   the	   closest	   kin	   tie	   between	   each	   household	  dyad.	  Given	  the	  ethnographic	  commentary	  on	  the	  importance	  of	  mother-­‐offspring	  ties,	  we	  distinguish	  such	  relationships	   from	  sibling	  and	   father	  relationships	  even	  though	  all	   three	  relationships	   are	   characterized	   by	   the	   same	   coefficient	   of	   relatedness.8	  Specifically,	   we	  enter	   the	   coefficient	   of	   relatedness	   as	   a	   series	   of	   four	   dummy	   variables:	   (1)	   mother-­‐offspring	  ties,	  𝑟 = 0.5;	  (2)	  father-­‐offspring	  and	  full	  sibling	  ties,	  𝑟 = 0.5;	  (3)	  other	  close	  kin	  ties	   where	  𝑟 ∈ 0.25, 0.5 ;	   (4)	   weaker	   ties	   where	  𝑟 ∈ 0.1, 0.25 .	   The	   omitted	   reference	  category	  relates	  to	  unrelated	  household	  dyads	  or	  those	  with	  the	  weakest	  ties,	  𝑟 ∈ 0, 0.1 .	  	  	   Whether	   motivated	   by	   tolerated	   scrounging	   or	   costly	   signaling,	   we	   anticipate	  redistributive	   transfers	   from	   households	   with	   relatively	   more	   meat	   to	   those	   with	   less.	  Similarly,	  the	  aforementioned	  ethic	  of	  generosity	  among	  the	  Mayangna	  and	  Miskito	  would	  stimulate	   transfers	   from	   wealthier	   households	   to	   poorer	   households.	   Several	   of	   our	  covariates	   speak	   to	   these	   imbalances	   of	   resources,	   including	   harvest	   of	   fish	   and	   game,	  ownership	  of	  pigs,	  and	  the	  wealth	  rankings.	  In	  all	  cases,	  we	  predict	  giving	  to	  increase	  with	  increased	  resources	  and	  for	  receiving	  to	  decrease	  with	  increased	  resources.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  primatologists	   could	   employ	   a	   variable	   to	   distinguish	   the	   “dominant	   to	   subordinate”	   relationship	   from	   the	  “subordinate	  to	  dominant”	  relationship	  within	  a	  dyad	  of	  the	  same	  two	  individuals	  (e.g.,	  Range	  and	  Noë,	  2002).	  8	  Of	  the	  36	  dyads	  in	  the	  “siblings	  and	  fathers”	  category,	  only	  one	  is	  characterized	  by	  a	  father-­‐offspring	  tie.	  The	  other	  35	  dyads	  have	  full	  sibling	  ties.	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   Based	  on	  ethnographic	  reports	  of	  donations	  to	  pastors	  (Helms,	  1971),	  we	  include	  a	  binary	  variable	  to	  denote	  the	  recipient	  households	  in	  which	  the	  community’s	  two	  pastors	  reside.	  	   There	   are	   no	   clear	   evolutionary	   predictions	   for	   the	   estimate	   of	   generalized	  reciprocity	   (Gurven,	   2004),	   but	   following	   the	   logic	   of	   marginal	   models	   (Winterhalder,	  1996),	  we	  predict	  a	  negative	  estimate	  as	  transfers	  flow	  from	  the	  “haves”	  to	  the	  “have-­‐nots.”	  Under	   the	   assumption	   that	   household-­‐level	   production	   of	   meat	   varies	   more	   than	  households’	   nutritional	   needs,	   we	   also	   anticipate	   a	   redistributive	   system	   in	   which	   the	  estimated	   giver-­‐level	   variance	   exceeds	   the	   receiver-­‐level	   variance.	   Similar	   differences	   in	  variance	   seem	   to	   characterize	   other	   networks	   in	   small-­‐scale	   societies	   (Kasper	   et	   al.,	  manuscript).	  	   In	   terms	   of	   dyadic	   reciprocity,	   we	   predict	   that	   the	   estimated	   correlation	   will	   be	  positive,	  which	  would	  support	  reciprocal	  altruism.	  	   The	   random	   effects	   in	   these	  models	   are	   assumed	   to	   be	   normally	   distributed,	   but	  there	   was	   a	   noteworthy	   outlier	   in	   the	   relationship-­‐level	   random	   effects.	  We	   therefore	  include	  a	  dummy	  variable	   to	   represent	   this	  outlier	  as	  a	   fixed	  effect	   (Langford	  and	  Lewis,	  2002).	  We	  discuss	  this	  outlier	  when	  we	  interpret	  the	  results.	  	   	  
5.4.	  Estimation	  We	   fit	   our	   count	   data	   SRM	   using	  Markov	   chain	  Monte	   Carlo	   (MCMC)	  methods	   as	  implemented	  in	  the	  WinBUGS	  statistical	  software	  package	  (see	  Supplementary	  File	  2	  for	  a	  full	  description	  of	  how	  the	  models	  were	  fitted	  in	  WinBUGS;	  cf,	  Gill	  and	  Swartz,	  2001,	  and	  Lüdtke	   et	   al.,	   2013	   who	   both	   fit	   the	   standard	   SRM	   for	   continuous	   response	   data	   using	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WinBUGS).	  We	  call	  WinBUGS	  from	  within	  Stata	  using	  the	  user	  written	  winbugs	  command	  (Thompson	   et	   al.,	   2006).	   We	   specify	   “diffuse”	   (i.e.	   “flat”	   or	   “uninformative”)	   prior	  distributions	   for	   all	   parameters.	  We	   run	   the	  models	   in	  WinBUGS	   for	   a	   burn-­‐in	  of	   50,000	  iterations	   to	   allow	   the	   chains	   to	   converge	   to	   their	   stationary	   distributions.	   We	   judge	  convergence	   by	   informal	   visual	   assessments	   of	   the	   parameter	   chains	   and	   through	  examining	   standard	  MCMC	   convergence	   diagnostics.	   The	   plots	   (not	   shown	  here)	   suggest	  the	   chains	  achieved	  stationarity	  well	  before	  50,000	   iterations.	  We	   then	  sampled	  100,000	  iterations.	  When	   we	   present	   our	   results,	   we	   report	   the	  means,	   standard	   deviations	   and	  2.5th	  and	  97.5th	  quantiles	   (95%	  credible	   intervals)	  of	   the	  100,000	  monitoring	   iterations.	  These	  quantities	  are	  analogous	  to	  the	  parameter	  estimates,	  standard	  errors	  and	  lower	  and	  upper	   bounds	   of	   the	   95%	   confidence	   intervals	   obtained	   in	   a	   frequentist	   analysis.	   We	  compare	  the	  fit	  of	  models	  via	  the	  deviance	  information	  criterion	  (DIC;	  Spiegelhalter	  et	  al.,	  2002):	   models	   with	   smaller	   DIC	   values	   are	   preferred	   to	   those	   with	   larger	   values,	   with	  differences	  of	  five	  or	  more	  considered	  substantial	  (Lunn	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  
	  
6.	  Results	  We	  present	  two	  models.	  Model	  1	  is	  the	  intercept-­‐only	  model	  presented	  in	  Section	  3	  and	  is	  used	  to	  quantify	  the	  relative	  importance	  of	  givers,	  receivers	  and	  unique	  relationships	  as	   sources	   of	   variation	   in	   household	   giving.	   Model	   2	   includes	   the	   association	   index	   and	  adjusts	  for	  the	  other	  household-­‐	  and	  dyad-­‐level	  covariates	  described	  in	  Section	  5.	  Table	  2	  presents	  the	  results.	  	  
	  
6.1	  Model	  1	  –	  The	  intercept-­‐only	  model	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The	  intercept,	  𝛽!,	   is	  estimated	  to	  be	  0.68.	  The	  population-­‐averaged	  number	  of	  gifts	  given	   per	   year,	   E 𝜇!" = exp 𝛽! + !! 𝜎!! + 𝜎!! + 𝜎!! , 	  is	   therefore	   estimated	   to	   be	  exp 0.68+ !! 0.66+ 0.26+ 1.25 = 5.84 . 9 	  This	   estimate	   slightly	   exceeds	   the	   average	  annualized	   observed	   rate	   of	   5.46	   gifts	   per	   year,	   reflecting	   the	   presence	   of	   some	   excess	  zeros	  in	  the	  data.	  The	  giver	  VPC,	  𝜎!! 𝜎!! + 𝜎!! + 𝜎!! ,	  is	  estimated	  as	  0.66 0.66+ 0.26+ 1.25 = 0.30	  and	   so	   30%	   of	   the	   variation	   in	   food	   transfers	   lies	   between	   households	   in	   their	   roles	   as	  givers.	  The	  receiver	  and	  relationship	  variances	  are	  estimated	  to	  account	  for	  12%	  and	  58%	  of	   the	  variation,	   respectively.	  Thus	  households	  vary	  more	   in	  how	  much	   they	  give	   than	   in	  how	  much	  they	  receive.	  However,	  it	  is	  the	  unique	  relationships	  between	  households	  which	  are	  the	  main	  source	  of	  variation	  in	  food	  transfers	  in	  these	  data.	  The	  statistical	  significance	  of	  each	  variance	  component	  is	  shown	  by	  a	  large	  increase	  in	  the	  DIC	  statistic	  when	  we	  omit	  the	  corresponding	  set	  of	  random	  effects	  from	  the	  model.	  Generalized	  reciprocity,	  𝜌!" ,	  is	  estimated	  to	  be	  -­‐0.48	  and	  so	  households	  who	  tend	  to	  give	  more	   gifts	   than	   average	   tend	   to	   receive	   less	   gifts	   than	   average	   and	   vice	   versa.	   This	  suggests	  a	  process	  of	  redistribution	  whereby	  some	  households	  are	  net	  givers	  of	  food,	  while	  others	  are	  net	  receivers.	  Dyadic	  reciprocity,  𝜌!! ,	  is	  estimated	  to	  be	  0.95	  and	  so	  when	  one	  household	  gives	  an	  especially	   high	   number	   of	   gifts	   to	   another	   household,	   that	   behavior	   is	   nearly	   always	  reciprocated.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  To	  calculate	  this	  prediction,	  we	  integrate	  out	  the	  random	  effects	  by	  making	  use	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  if	  a	  random	  variable	   is	   log	   normally	   distributed	   with	   mean	  𝜇 	  and	   variance	  𝜎! ,	   then	   its	   expected	   value	   is	   given	   by	  exp 𝜇   + !!𝜎! .	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6.2	  Model	  2	  –	  Including	  household-­‐	  and	  relationship-­‐level	  covariates	  Model	   2	   shows	   a	   reduction	   in	   the	   DIC	   statistic	   of	   2245− 2198 = 47 	  points,	  confirming	  that	  collectively	  the	  covariates	  improve	  the	  fit	  of	  the	  model.	  Households	  who	  harvest	  more	  game	  (𝛽! = 0.45)	  and	  own	  more	  pigs	  (𝛽! = 0.12)	  are	  predicted	  to	  give	  significantly	  more	  gifts	  than	  households	  who	  harvest	  less	  game	  and	  own	  less	  pigs.	  However,	  there	  is	  no	  significant	  relationship	  between	  fish	  harvest	  (𝛽! = 0.27)	  or	  overall	  household	  wealth	   (𝛽! = 0.01)	   and	  giving,	  having	  adjusted	   for	   the	  other	   factors	   in	  the	  model.	  There	  is	  no	  significant	  association	  between	  the	  amount	  of	  game	  (𝛽! = −0.10)	  or	  fish	  (𝛽! = −0.77)	   that	  households	  harvest	   or	   the	  number	  of	   pigs	   they	  own	   (𝛽! = −0.06)	   and	  the	  number	   of	   gifts	   they	   tended	   to	   receive	   from	  other	   households.	  However,	   households	  whose	   overall	   wealth	   was	   higher	   were	   predicted	   to	   receive	   significantly	   fewer	   gifts	  (𝛽! = −0.05).	   The	   two	   pastors’	   households	  were	   predicted	   to	   receive	   significantly	  more	  gifts	  (𝛽! = 0.79)	  than	  the	  other	  households.	  There	   is	  a	  significant	  positive	  monotonic	  relationship	  between	  genetic	  relatedness	  and	   giving.	   Figure	   2	   plots	   the	   predicted	   number	   of	   gifts	   by	   genetic	   relatedness	   to	   give	   a	  better	  sense	  of	  this	  relationship.	  Transfers	  are	  biased	  toward	  close	  kin,	  especially	  between	  households	  that	  have	  mother-­‐offspring	  ties	  (𝛽!" = 1.47).	  Furthermore,	  the	  model	  predicts	  greater	  transfers	  between	  households	  with	  full	  sibling	  or	  father-­‐offspring	  ties	  (𝛽!! = 0.94)	  than	  households	  that	  have	  moderately	  weaker	  genetic	  ties	  (𝛽!" = 0.27),	  which	  is	  consistent	  with	  kin	   selection.	  The	  effects	  of	   kinship	  are	  quickly	   attenuated,	  however,	   as	  households	  with	   cousin	   ties	   (𝑟 = 0.125 )	   exhibit	   propensities	   for	   sharing	   (𝛽!" = 0.01 )	   that	   are	  undifferentiated	   from	   the	   reference	   category,	   dyads	   without	   noteworthy	   kin	   ties.	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Households	   located	   farther	   apart	   are	   predicted	   to	   give	   less	   (𝛽!" = −0.63)	   than	   nearby	  households.	  Distance	   is	  entered	  as	  a	   log-­‐transformed	  variable	  and	  so	   its	   coefficient	  has	  a	  partial	  elasticity	  interpretation:	  a	  10%	  increase	  in	  the	  distance	  between	  two	  households	  is	  associated	  with	  a	  6.3%	  decrease	   in	   the	  expected	  number	  of	  gifts	  exchanged	  between	   the	  two	   households.	   Regarding	   the	   association	   index,	   households	   who	   associated	   more	  frequently	  with	  one	  another	  were	  predicted	  to	  give	  more	  (𝛽!" = 4.02),	  even	  after	  adjusting	  for	  their	  higher	  genetic	  relatedness	  and	  closer	  proximity.	  The	  positive	  estimate	  relating	  to	  the	  outlying	  dyad	  (𝛽!" = 2.47),	  shows	  that	  the	  number	  of	  gifts	  given	  between	  Household	  1	  and	  Household	  25	  was	  significantly	  higher	  than	  that	  predicted	  by	  the	  model.	  This	  outlying	  dyad	   was	   comprised	   of	   two	   households	   that	   lacked	   a	   close	   kinship	   tie	   and	   that	   lived	  relatively	   far	   from	  each	  other,	  but	  each	  exhibited	  a	  close	  relationship	  with	  the	  household	  that	  produced	  more	  hunted	  game	  than	  any	  other	  household	   in	  the	  community,	  and	  there	  may	  have	  occasionally	  been	  expectations	  that	  transfers	  to	  one	  member	  of	  the	  dyad	  would	  also	  entail	  secondary	  transfers	  to	  the	  other.	  The	  giver,	   receiver	  and	  relationship	  variances,	  𝜎!!,𝜎!!	  and	  𝜎!!,	  are	  now	  estimated	  to	  be	   0.30,	   0.18	   and	   0.29,	   respectively.	   Comparing	   these	   results	   to	   Model	   1,	   shows	   that	  adjusting	   for	   the	   household	   and	   relationship	   characteristics	   explain	   away	  0.66− 0.30 0.66 = 0.55	  or	  55%	  of	  the	  variation	  in	  giving	  behavior	  between	  households,	  31%	   of	   the	   variation	   in	   receiver	   behavior	   and	   77%	   of	   the	   variation	   in	   relationship	  behavior.	  Generalized	   reciprocity,	  𝜌!" ,	   is	   now	   estimated	   to	   be	   0.08,	   substantially	   lower	   in	  absolute	   value	   than	   the	   estimate	   of	   -­‐0.48	   reported	   in	  Model	   1,	   and	   the	   correlation	   is	   no	  longer	   significantly	   different	   from	   zero.	   Thus,	   the	   pattern	   of	   negative	   generalized	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reciprocity	  seen	  in	  the	  empty	  model	  is	  explained	  by	  the	  inclusion	  of	  the	  giver	  and	  receiver	  characteristics;	  the	  covariates	  explain	  why	  households	  are	  net	  givers	  or	  receivers	  of	  food.	  	  Dyadic	  reciprocity,  𝜌!! ,	  is	  now	  estimated	  to	  be	  0.77,	  lower	  than	  the	  estimate	  of	  0.95	  reported	  in	  Model	  1.	  Nevertheless,	  even	  after	  accounting	  for	  the	  genetic	  relatedness	  of	  the	  households	  in	  each	  dyad	  as	  well	  as	  their	  physical	  distance	  apart	  and	  association	  index,	  we	  continue	  to	  see	  a	  very	  strong	  relationship	  whereby	  when	  one	  household	  gives	  an	  especially	  high	  number	  of	  gifts	  to	  another	  household,	  that	  behavior	  is	  very	  often	  reciprocated.	  	  
7.	  Discussion	  
7.1	  Substantive	  findings	  	   Households	  that	  spend	  greater	  amounts	  of	  time	  together	  also	  exchange	  meat	  more	  frequently,	   as	   reflected	   by	   the	   strong	   statistical	   support	   for	   the	   association	   index	   as	   a	  predictor	   of	   meat	   sharing.	   This	   result	   underscores	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   food	   sharing	   is	  embedded	  in	  broader	  social	  relationships	  between	  households.	  Ethnographic	  observations	  suggest	  that	  food	  sharing	  is	  particularly	  common	  among	  households	  that	  regularly	  engage	  in	   mutually	   advantageous	   activities,	   such	   as	   cooperative	   childcare	   and	   collaborative	  agricultural	   labor.	   As	   noted	  previously,	   it	   is	   possible	   that	   sharing	  meat	   acts	   as	   a	   form	  of	  trade	   for	   other	   currencies.	   Alternatively,	   sharing	   meat	   could	   serve	   partly	   as	   a	   signal	   of	  commitment	  to	  the	  long-­‐term	  maintenance	  of	  the	  relationship	  (see	  Nolin,	  2010).	  	  Although	  the	  underlying	  mechanisms	  remain	  unclear,	   the	  significant	  effect	  of	   the	  association	   index	  highlights	  the	  need	  for	  future	  research	  to	  situate	  food	  sharing	  within	  the	  context	  of	  broader	  inter-­‐household	  relationships.	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   Despite	  exhibiting	  a	  strong	  positive	  effect	  on	  sharing,	  the	  association	  index	  does	  not	  greatly	   increase	   the	  predictive	  accuracy	  of	   the	   full	  model,	   as	   the	  DIC	   improves	  by	  only	  1	  unit	  when	   compared	   to	   a	  model	   that	   lacks	   the	   association	   index	   (Supplementary	   File	   1,	  Table	  S1).	  This	  seemingly	  contradictory	  result	  reflects	  the	  strong	  correlation	  between	  the	  association	   index	   and	   the	   categorical	   variables	   for	   kinship	   ties	   between	   houses	  (Supplementary	   File	   1,	   Figure	   S1).	   In	   other	   words,	   household	   dyads	   that	   spend	  considerable	  time	  together	  typically	  have	  close	  kinship	  ties,	  particularly	  mother-­‐offspring	  ties	  or	  sibling	  ties.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  the	  collinearity,	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  variables	  for	  kin	  ties	  are	  mitigated	   when	   the	   association	   index	   is	   included	   in	   the	   statistical	   model.	   Rather	   than	  characterizing	   the	   association	   index	   as	   redundant	   with	   kinship	   as	   a	   predictor	   of	   food	  sharing,	   these	  models	   are	   a	   reminder	   that	   kinship	   frequently	   structures	   the	   patterns	   of	  social	   organization	   and	   interaction	   in	   small-­‐scale	   societies,	   not	   only	   in	   terms	   of	   food	  sharing	  but	  also	  in	  the	  formation	  of	  cooperative	  social	  groups	  (Hames,	  1987;	  Alvard,	  2009).	  The	  main	  insight	  from	  the	  analysis	  in	  this	  paper	  is	  that	  food	  sharing	  networks	  in	  Arang	  Dak	  largely	  coincide	  with	  the	  kin-­‐based	  networks	  of	  social	   interaction	  and	  grouping.	  Whereas	  other	   studies	   have	   shown	   that	   households	   with	   close	   kinship	   ties	   exhibit	   greater	  reciprocity	  of	  food	  sharing	  than	  distantly	  related	  household	  dyads	  (Allen-­‐Arave	  et	  al.,	  2008;	  see	  also	  Nolin,	  2010),	  this	  study	  demonstrates	  that	  closely	  related	  households	  spend	  more	  time	   together	   and	   therefore	   have	   more	   opportunities	   to	   resolve	   imbalances	   of	   food	  transfers	  via	  trade,	  not	  just	  via	  reciprocated	  food.	  	   In	  addition	  to	  the	  association	  index,	  other	  covariates	  exhibit	  noteworthy	  effects	  that	  support	  multiple	   evolutionary	  models	   of	   food	   sharing.	   As	  with	   the	   research	   of	   Silk	   et	   al.	  (2013)	   on	   chimpanzees,	   we	   conclude	   that	   people	   share	   food	   for	   many	   reasons.	   For	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instance,	   the	   categorical	   variables	   for	   kinship	   ties	   are	   consistent	  with	   kin	   selection.	   The	  results	   also	   provide	   evidence	   in	   support	   of	   a	   redistributive	   model	   of	   food	   sharing,	   as	  households	  that	  regularly	  harvest	  game	  and	  own	  more	  pigs	  give	  greater	  amounts	  of	  meat	  to	  other	  households.	  Although	  these	  redistributive	  flows	  from	  houses	  with	  large	  quantities	  of	  meat	   could	   reflect	   trades	   for	   unidentified	   currencies,	   our	   ethnographic	   perspective	   is	  that	  meat	   is	   typically	   given	  without	   clear	   expectations	   of	   repayment,	   and	   these	   patterns	  might	   better	   be	   characterized	   as	   investments	   in	   long-­‐term	   mutualistic	   relationships,	   or	  perhaps	   as	   tolerated	   scrounging	   or	   costly	   signaling	   (cf.	   Koster,	   2011b).	   In	   contrast	   to	  hunted	   game	   and	   ownership	   of	   pigs,	   variation	   in	   harvests	   of	   fish	   does	   not	   predict	  meat	  sharing,	   which	   we	   partly	   attribute	   to	   the	   relatively	   small	   proportion	   of	   fish	   that	   are	  transferred	   as	   gifts	   (as	   in	   Figure	   1).	   The	  wealth	   ranking	   of	   giving	   households	   is	   also	   an	  uninformative	   predictor,	   apparently	   because	   wealth	   does	   not	   reliably	   correlate	   with	  supplies	   of	   transferable	   meat.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	   wealth	   ranking	   of	   receiving	  households	  exhibits	  a	  negative	  effect,	  as	  poorer	  households	  receive	  significantly	  more	  gifts	  than	   their	   wealthier	   counterparts.	   This	   result	   might	   reflect	   need-­‐based	   transfers	   to	  households	  with	  few	  options	  for	  purchasing	  meat.	  As	  in	  several	  other	  studies	  (Gurven	  et	  al.,	  2000;	  Ziker	  and	  Schnegg,	  2005;	  Hames	  and	  McCabe,	  2007;	  Allen-­‐Arave	  et	  al.,	  2008;	  Nolin,	  2010),	   food	   sharing	   increases	   with	   increasing	   proximity	   between	   households,	   which	   is	  noteworthy	  given	   that	   the	  model	   controls	   for	  other	   relationship-­‐level	   covariates	   that	   are	  correlated	   with	   distance,	   including	   kinship	   and	   the	   association	   index	   (cf.	   Patton,	   2005;	  Hames	   and	   McCabe,	   2007).	   Although	   distance	   lacks	   a	   clear	   evolutionary	   interpretation,	  there	   are	   numerous	   beneficial	   ways	   in	   which	   neighbors	   can	   cooperate,	   such	   as	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collaborative	   vigilance	   against	   thieves,	   which	   could	   plausibly	   promote	   gifts	   of	  meat	   that	  help	  to	  maintain	  amicable	  relationships	  with	  neighbors.	  	   Evolutionary	   anthropologists	   have	   generally	   examined	   generalized	   reciprocity	   by	  testing	   the	   correlation	   between	   the	   corresponding	   marginal	   sums	   from	   a	   sociomatrix	  (Gurven	   et	   al.,	   2002).	   The	   Social	   Relations	   Model,	   by	   contrast,	   derives	   the	   generalized	  reciprocity	  correlation	  from	  the	  giver	  and	  random	  effects,	  which	  advantageously	  offers	  the	  opportunity	  to	  determine	  how	  the	  correlation	  changes	  upon	  the	  inclusion	  of	  covariates.	  In	  the	  intercept-­‐only	  model,	  the	  generalized	  reciprocity	  correlation	  is	  negative,	  as	  households	  that	   give	   frequently	   receive	   comparatively	   less	   in	   return.	   This	   effect	   becomes	   negligible	  with	   the	   inclusion	  of	   the	  covariates,	  and	  a	  related	  analysis	  by	  Koster	   (2011b)	   leads	  us	   to	  infer	  that	  the	  weakening	  of	  the	  correlation	  in	  the	  full	  model	  largely	  reflects	  the	  inclusion	  of	  the	  variable	  for	  the	  giving	  households’	  harvests	  of	  hunted	  game.	  In	  the	  Social	  Relations	  Model,	  reciprocity	  in	  unique	  relationships	  is	  assessed	  via	  the	  dyadic	   reciprocity	   correlation,	   which	   circumvents	   the	   undesirable	   practice	   of	   treating	  transfers	   between	   households	   as	   both	   an	   outcome	   and	   predictor	   variable	   in	   the	   same	  statistical	   model,	   as	   in	   several	   previous	   studies	   of	   food	   sharing	   (for	   a	   discussion,	   see	  Gurven	   et	   al.,	   2000).	   In	   the	   models	   presented	   here,	   the	   dyadic	   reciprocity	   correlation	  reveals	  considerable	  reciprocal	  meat	  sharing	  between	  households,	  even	  after	  adjusting	  for	  other	   covariates.	   These	   results	   therefore	   provide	   clear	   evidence	   for	   the	   contingent	  transfers	   that	   characterize	   reciprocal	   altruism	   (Gurven,	   2004).	   When	   interpreting	   this	  correlation,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   remember	   that	   the	  model	   is	   simultaneously	   estimating	   the	  random	  effects	  for	  households’	  respective	  giving	  and	  receiving	  tendencies.	  The	  correlation	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therefore	   represents	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   dyads	   exchange	   gifts	   beyond	   what	   would	   be	  expected	  from	  these	  tendencies.10	  	   Although	   evolutionary	   anthropologists	   typically	   regard	   behavior	   as	   an	   adaptive	  response	   to	   local	   environmental	   conditions	   (Winterhalder	   and	   Smith,	   2000),	   there	   is	  increasing	  recognition	  that	  behavior	  is	  influenced	  by	  cultural	  norms	  that	  may	  deviate	  from	  the	  optimal	  evolutionary	  strategy	  (e.g.,	  Tucker,	  2012).	  In	  this	  study,	  the	  residents	  of	  Arang	  Dak	   exhibit	   sharing	   behavior	   that	   parallels	   behavior	   observed	   by	   other	   anthropologists	  who	   have	  worked	  with	   the	  Miskito	   (Helms	   1971;	   Nietschmann	   1973).	   In	   particular,	   the	  practices	   of	   giving	   considerable	   food	   to	   mothers,	   pastors,	   and	   poorer	   households	   are	  apparently	  consistent	  social	  norms	  that	  persist	  over	  decades	  in	  this	  society.	  Furthermore,	  the	  coastal	  Miskito	  studied	  by	  Nietschmann	  (1973)	  exhibit	  maritime	  subsistence	  strategies	  that	  differ	  substantially	  from	  those	  in	  Arang	  Dak,	  including	  the	  seasonal	  exploitation	  of	  sea	  turtles	  versus	  an	  orientation	  toward	  terrestrial	  hunting,	  which	  may	  pose	  challenges	  for	  the	  view	   of	   food	   sharing	   strategies	   as	   an	   adaptive	   pattern	   that	   closely	   corresponds	   to	   local	  socio-­‐ecological	   conditions.	   We	   hesitate	   to	   portray	   these	   norms	   as	   maladaptive,	  particularly	   given	   evidence	   that	   charitable	   giving	   can	   adaptively	   enhance	   reputations	  (Barclay,	   2011).	   This	   study	   nevertheless	   highlights	   the	   need	   for	   evolutionary	  anthropologists	  to	  devote	  increased	  attention	  to	  the	  cultural	  transmission	  of	  food	  sharing	  norms.	  	  
7.2	  Methodological	  extensions	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  If	  we	  modify	   the	   intercept-­‐only	  model	   to	   exclude	   the	   random	   effects	   (varying	   intercepts)	   for	   giving	   and	  receiving	  households,	  then	  the	  dyadic	  reciprocity	  correlation	  is	  reduced	  from	  0.95	  to	  0.34.	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In	   this	   paper	   we	   have	   applied	   an	   adaptation	   of	   the	   SRM	   for	   count	   data.	   As	   in	  standard	  applications	  of	  the	  SRM	  to	  continuous	  data,	  we	  have	  modeled	  the	  giver,	  receiver	  and	  relationship	  variances	  as	  well	  as	  the	  generalized	  and	  dyadic	  reciprocity	  correlations	  as	  homogenous	   parameters.	   One	   interesting	   extension	   would	   be	   to	   include	   random	  coefficients	   (varying	   slopes)	   in	   order	   to	   model	   these	   parameters	   as	   functions	   of	   the	  covariates.	  We	  could,	   for	  example,	   then	  model	  whether	  dyadic	   reciprocity	   increases	  with	  the	  genetic	  relatedness	  of	  household	  dyads	  (Allen-­‐Arave,	  et	  al.,	  2008).	  A	   second	   extension	   would	   be	   to	   model	   not	   only	   the	   number	   of	   portions	   gifted	  between	  households,	  but,	  simultaneously,	  the	  number	  of	  portions	  which	  are	  sold	  from	  one	  household	   to	   another	   as	  well	   as	   the	   number	   of	   portions	  which	   are	   simply	   retained.	  One	  approach	  would	  be	  to	  treat	  these	  data	  as	  multinomial	  grouped	  data	  where	  the	  number	  of	  “trials”	  is	  the	  total	  number	  of	  portions	  in	  each	  household,	  while	  the	  “number	  of	  successes”	  in	  each	  “outcome	  category”	  are	  given	  by	  the	  counts	  of	  the	  number	  of	  portions	  given,	  sold	  and	  retained.	  We	  can	  then	  introduce	  covariates	  into	  this	  model	  to	  test	  hypotheses	  as	  to	  the	  factors	  which	  predict	  household-­‐level	  decision	  making.	  	  A	   third	   possible	   extension	  would	   be	   to	   extend	   the	  model	   to	   a	   longitudinal	   dyadic	  data	   analysis	   and	   then	   analyze	   the	  month-­‐by-­‐month	   counts	   rather	   than	   the	   annual	   total	  counts	  considered	  here.	  One	  could	  then	  look	  at	  the	  stability	  of	  parameter	  effects	  over	  time	  and	   explore	   whether	   there	   are	   seasonal	   trends	   in	   household	   giving	   and	   receiving	  tendencies	  (see	  Ward	  and	  Hoff,	  2007;	  Ward	  et	  al.,	  2013).	  A	  longitudinal	  framework	  would	  potentially	  also	  allow	  one	  to	  explore	  dynamic	  tit-­‐for-­‐tat	  patterns	  of	  reciprocity	  in	  addition	  to	   contemporaneous	   reciprocity	   addressed	   here.	   Alternatively,	   social	   network	   statistical	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models	  could	  be	   fitted	  to	   these	  data;	   in	  particular	  Snijder's	  SOAM	  model	  (Snijders,	  1996)	  could	  be	  used	  to	  model	  the	  month-­‐by-­‐month	  evolution	  of	  the	  food	  sharing	  network.	  	  
8.	  Conclusion	  	   In	   recent	  decades,	  evolutionary	  anthropologists	  have	  shown	   that	   the	  structures	  of	  food	  sharing	  networks	   in	  small-­‐scale	  societies	  often	  conform	  to	  predictions	  derived	   from	  evolutionary	  hypotheses,	  such	  as	  kin	  selection	  and	  reciprocal	  altruism.	  The	  analysis	  in	  this	  paper	   provides	   additional	   support	   for	   those	   evolutionary	   perspectives	   while	   also	  elucidating	   thematic	   extensions	   and	   statistical	   alternatives	   that	   could	   enhance	   future	  research	   on	   food	   sharing.	   Evolutionary	   anthropologists	   are	   admittedly	   reductionist,	  typically	  employing	  heuristic	  models	   that	  parallel	   those	  used	  by	  economists	  and	   focusing	  primarily	   on	   covariates	  with	   straightforward	   evolutionary	   interpretations	   (Winterhalder	  and	  Smith,	  2000).	  Our	  analysis,	  however,	  reveals	  that	  food	  sharing	  networks	  are	  embedded	  in	   broader	   inter-­‐household	   relationships	   that	   encompass	   a	   broad	   array	   of	   social	  interactions	   and	   culturally-­‐mediated	   roles.	   Much	   like	   Granovetter	   (1985)	   encouraged	  economists	  to	  consider	  the	  social	  context	  of	  economic	  transactions,	  we	  therefore	  highlight	  the	  need	  for	  evolutionary	  anthropologists	  to	  devote	  greater	  attention	  to	  the	  emergence	  and	  maintenance	   of	   cultural	   norms	   that	   influence	   food	   sharing,	   such	   as	   distinctions	   between	  genetic	   and	   cultural	   kinship	   and	   the	   introduction	   of	   norms	   by	   missionaries	   and	   other	  external	  agents.	  	   Statistically,	   the	   SRM	   represents	   a	   promising	   alternative	   to	   matrix	   permutation	  methods	  and	  multilevel	  modeling	  approaches	  that	  do	  not	  fully	  accommodate	  the	  structure	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of	  network	  data.11	  We	  presented	  a	  version	  of	   the	  SRM	  that	   is	  appropriate	   for	  count	  data,	  but	   we	   note	   that	   the	   advantages	   of	   the	   SRM	   would	   apply	   equally	   to	   continuous	   or	  dichotomous	   outcomes.	   We	   have	   also	   discussed	   possible	   extensions	   of	   the	   SRM,	   which	  could	  likewise	  be	  implemented	  for	  a	  variety	  of	  outcome	  types,	  that	  could	  further	  enrich	  the	  analysis	   of	   the	   highly	   detailed	   datasets	   that	   characterize	   ethnographic	   research	   by	  anthropologists	  in	  small-­‐scale	  societies.	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FIGURE	  LEGENDS	  	  
Fig.	   1.	   For	   each	   resource	   type,	   the	   total	   number	   of	   portions	   that	   were	   given	   to	   other	  households,	  sold	  to	  other	  households,	  or	  consumed	  within	  the	  household	  that	  produced	  the	  resource.	  	  The	  analysis	  in	  this	  paper	  is	  based	  only	  on	  the	  sum	  of	  gifted	  portions	  (regardless	  of	  resource	  type)	  exchanged	  between	  households,	  not	  sold	  or	  household	  portions.	  	  
Fig.	   2.	   Predicted	  number	  of	   gifts	  per	  year	  by	  household	  dyad	   closest	   relatedness	   tie:	   (1)	  mother-­‐offspring	  ties	  (𝑟 = 0.5);	  (2)	  father-­‐offspring	  and	  sibling	  ties	  (𝑟 = 0.5);	  (3)	  other	  ties	  where	  𝑟 ∈ 0.25, 0.5 ;	  (4)	  other	  ties	  where	  𝑟 ∈ 0.125, 0.25 ;	  (5)	  other	  ties	  where	  𝑟 ∈ 0, 0.125 .	  These	  predictions	  are	  calculated	  holding	  all	  other	  covariates	  at	  their	  mean	  values,	  with	  the	  exception	  of	   the	  outlier	  dummy	  variable	  and	   the	  pastor	  effect,	  which	  are	   set	   to	   zero.	  We	  integrate	  out	  the	  giver,	  receiver	  and	  relationship	  random	  effects.	  	  


















Table	  1.	  Variable	  names,	  descriptions	  and	  summary	  statistics	  
	  
Variable	   Description	   N	   Mean	   Std.	  
Dev.	  
Min	   Max	  
Household-­‐level	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  Game	   Kg	  meat	  harvested	  per	  day	   25	   0.79	   1.43	   0.01	   6.09	  	  Fish	   Kg	  fish	  harvested	  per	  day	   25	   0.25	   0.19	   0.03	   0.74	  	  Pigs	   Average	  #	  of	  pigs	  owned	  during	  study	  period	   25	   3.58	   2.62	   0.00	   9.50	  	  Wealth	   Household	  wealth	  index	   25	   15.27	   6.20	   7.27	   27.4	  	  Pastors	   Dummy	  variable	  to	  denote	  a	  pastor	  in	  the	  receiving	  household	   25	   0.08	   	   0.00	   1.00	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Relationship-­‐
level	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  	  Relatedness1	   Dummy	  variable	  to	  denote	  closest	  tie	  is	  a	  mother-­‐offspring	  tie	  (𝑟 = 0.5)	   600	   0.06	   	   0.00	   1.00	  	  Relatedness2	   Dummy	  variable	  to	  denote	  closest	  tie	  is	  a	  father-­‐offspring	  or	  full	  sibling	  tie	  (𝑟 = 0.5)	   600	   0.12	   	   0.00	   1.00	  	  Relatedness3	   Dummy	  variable	  to	  denote	  closest	  tie	  has	  	  𝑟 ∈ 0.25, 0.5 	   600	   0.21	   	   0.00	   1.00	  	  Relatedness4	   Dummy	  variable	  to	  denote	  closest	  tie	  has	  𝑟 ∈ 0.1, 0.25 	   600	   0.26	   	   0.00	   1.00	  	  Distance	   Distance	  (km)	  between	  the	  two	  households,	  log	  transformed	   600	   0.12	   0.06	   0.02	   0.36	  
	  Association	   Index	  of	  frequency	  with	  which	  the	  two	  households	  interact	   600	   0.04	   0.08	   0.00	   0.55	  	  
Table	  2	  Results	  for	  Models	  1	  and	  2.	  	  
	  	   Model	  1	   Model	  2	  Parameter	   Mean	   Std.	  Dev.	   Mean	   Std.	  Dev.	  𝛽!	   Intercept	   0.68	   0.16	   -­‐0.92	   0.63	  𝛽!	   Giver	  –	  Game	  	   ̶	   ̶	   0.45	   0.08	  𝛽!	   Giver	  –	  Fish	   ̶	   ̶	   0.27	   0.77	  𝛽!	   Giver	  –	  Pigs	   ̶	   ̶	   0.12	   0.05	  𝛽!	   Giver	  –	  Wealth	   ̶	   ̶	   0.01	   0.02	  𝛽!	   Receiver	  –	  Game	   ̶	   ̶	   -­‐0.10	   0.07	  𝛽!	   Receiver	  –	  Fish	   ̶	   ̶	   -­‐0.77	   0.58	  𝛽!	   Receiver	  –	  Pigs	   ̶	   ̶	   -­‐0.06	   0.04	  𝛽!	   Receiver	  –	  Wealth	   ̶	   ̶	   -­‐0.05	   0.02	  𝛽!	   Receiver	  –	  Pastors	   ̶	   ̶	   0.79	   0.37	  𝛽!"	   Relationship	  –	  Relatedness1	   ̶	   ̶	   1.47	   0.26	  𝛽!!	   Relationship	  –	  Relatedness2	   ̶	   ̶	   0.94	   0.17	  𝛽!"	   Relationship	  –	  Relatedness3	   ̶	   ̶	   0.27	   0.14	  𝛽!"	   Relationship	  –	  Relatedness4	  	   ̶	   ̶	   0.01	   0.14	  𝛽!"	   Relationship	  –	  Distance	  (log	  transformed)	   ̶	   ̶	   -­‐0.63	   0.08	  𝛽!"	   Relationship	  –	  Association	  index	   ̶	   ̶	   4.02	   0.65	  𝛽!"	   Relationship	  –	  Giver	  1	  &	  Receiver	  25	   ̶	   ̶	   2.47	   0.62	  𝜎!!	   Giver	  variance	   0.66	   0.22	   0.30	   0.11	  𝜎!!	   Receiver	  variance	   0.26	   0.09	   0.18	   0.07	  𝜎!!	   Relationship	  variance	   1.25	   0.13	   0.29	   0.04	  𝜌!" 	   Generalized	  reciprocity	  correlation	   -­‐0.48	   0.19	   0.08	   0.24	  𝜌!! 	   Dyadic	  reciprocity	  correlation	   0.95	   0.03	   0.77	   0.10	  	   Giver	  VPC	  (relative	  variance)	   0.30	   0.07	   0.39	   0.08	  	   Receiver	  VPC	  (relative	  variance)	   0.12	   0.04	   0.23	   0.07	  	   Relationship	  VPC	  (relative	  variance)	   0.58	   0.07	   0.38	   0.07	  DIC	   Deviance	  Information	  Criterion	   2245	   2198	  
Note:	   All	   models	   are	   run	   for	   a	   burn-­‐in	   of	   50,000	   iterations	   and	   a	   monitoring	   chain	   of	  100,000	  iterations.	  Diffuse	  prior	  distributions	  are	  specified	  for	  all	  parameters.	  Parameters	  in	  bold	  represent	  effects	  whose	  95%	  credible	  intervals	  do	  not	  include	  zero	  (or,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  three	  variance	  parameters,	  whose	  DIC	  statistics	  increase	  by	  five	  or	  more	  points)	  and	  are	  therefore	  viewed	  as	  statistically	  significantly	  different	  from	  zero.	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Supplementary	  Table	  S1	  Results	  for	  Model	  2a,	  which	  parallels	  Model	  2	  except	  for	  the	  omission	  of	  the	  association	  index	  as	  a	  covariate.	  	  
	  	   Model	  2a	  Parameter	   Mean	   Std.	  Dev.	  𝛽!	   Intercept	   -­‐1.03	   0.68	  𝛽!	   Giver	  –	  Game	  	   0.47	   0.08	  𝛽!	   Giver	  –	  Fish	   0.16	   0.82	  𝛽!	   Giver	  –	  Pigs	   0.13	   0.06	  𝛽!	   Giver	  –	  Wealth	   0.00	   0.02	  𝛽!	   Receiver	  –	  Game	   -­‐0.08	   0.07	  𝛽!	   Receiver	  –	  Fish	   -­‐0.74	   0.65	  𝛽!	   Receiver	  –	  Pigs	   -­‐0.05	   0.05	  𝛽!	   Receiver	  –	  Wealth	   -­‐0.05	   0.02	  𝛽!	   Receiver	  –	  Pastors	   0.73	   0.37	  𝛽!"	   Relationship	  –	  Relatedness1	   2.55	   0.21	  𝛽!!	   Relationship	  –	  Relatedness2	   1.30	   0.17	  𝛽!"	   Relationship	  –	  Relatedness3	   0.40	   0.15	  𝛽!"	   Relationship	  –	  Relatedness4	  	   0.08	   0.15	  𝛽!"	   Relationship	  –	  Distance	  (log	  transformed)	   -­‐0.69	   0.09	  𝛽!"	   Relationship	  –	  Association	  index	   ̶	   ̶	  𝛽!"	   Relationship	  –	  Giver	  1	  &	  Receiver	  25	   2.73	   0.70	  𝜎!!	   Giver	  variance	   0.35	   0.13	  𝜎!!	   Receiver	  variance	   0.19	   0.08	  𝜎!!	   Relationship	  variance	   0.38	   0.05	  𝜌!" 	   Generalized	  reciprocity	  correlation	   0.23	   0.25	  𝜌!! 	   Dyadic	  reciprocity	  correlation	   0.81	   0.08	  	   Giver	  VPC	  (relative	  variance)	   0.38	   0.08	  	   Receiver	  VPC	  (relative	  variance)	   0.21	   0.07	  	   Relationship	  VPC	  (relative	  variance)	   0.41	   0.07	  DIC	   Deviance	  Information	  Criterion	   2199	  
Note:	   All	   models	   are	   run	   for	   a	   burn-­‐in	   of	   50,000	   iterations	   and	   a	   monitoring	   chain	   of	  100,000	  iterations.	  Diffuse	  prior	  distributions	  are	  specified	  for	  all	  parameters.	  Parameters	  in	   bold	   represent	   effects	   whose	   95%	   credible	   intervals	   do	   not	   include	   zero	   and	   are	  therefore	  viewed	  as	  statistically	  significantly	  different	  from	  zero.	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Supplementary	  file	  2	  –	  Fitting	  the	  Multilevel	  SRM	  for	  count	  data	  in	  WinBUGS	  	  To	   fit	   the	   SRM	   in	   WinBUGS,	   we	   must	   first	   write	   the	   necessary	   WinBUGS	   model	  specification,	  data	  and	   initial	  values	   files.	  We	   then	  write	  a	  WinBUGS	  script	   file	   that	   loads	  these	   three	   files,	   specifies	   the	   burn-­‐in	   and	  monitoring	   periods	   for	   the	  MCMC	   chain,	   and	  specifies	  the	  name	  of	  the	  output	  files	  where	  the	  MCMC	  chains	  will	  be	  automatically	  stored.	  i	  The	  WinBUGS	  language	  used	  in	  these	  text	  files	  is	  easy	  to	  read	  and	  is	  similar	  to	  the	  popular	  R	  language	  used	  in	  the	  R	  general-­‐statistical	  package.	  Below,	  we	  describe	  the	  files	  for	  Model	  2.	  We	  then	  show	  how	  to	  run	  these	  files	  in	  WinBUGS	  to	  replicate	  the	  presented	  results.ii	  The	  WinBUGS	  Manual	  (Spiegelhalter	  et	  al.,	  2003)	  and	  the	  text	  books	  by	  Lunn	  et	  al.	  (2012)	  and	  Ntzoufras	  (2009)	  provide	  accessible	  introductions	  to	  the	  WinBUGS	  software.	  	  
	  
Model	  specification	  file	  	  The	   “model	  specification	   file”,	  named	  model2.txt,	   specifies	   the	  model	  using	  a	  series	  of	  statements	  written	  within	  a	  single	  overall	  model	  statement:	  	  
model{ 
 
  # Dyadic response distributions 
  for(d in 1:300) { 
   
    # Observed gifts from A to B modeled as Poisson distributed 
    giftsAB[d] ~ dpois(muAB[d]) 
     
    # Observed gifts from B to A modeled as Poisson distributed  
    giftsBA[d] ~ dpois(muBA[d]) 
 
    # Linear predictor for log of expected gifts from A to B 
    log(muAB[d]) <- offset[d]  
                  + beta[1] 
                  + beta[2]*hgame[hidA[d]] 
                  + beta[3]*hfish[hidA[d]] 
                  + beta[4]*hpigs[hidA[d]] 
                  + beta[5]*hwealth[hidA[d]] 
                  + beta[6]*hgame[hidB[d]] 
                  + beta[7]*hfish[hidB[d]] 
                  + beta[8]*hpigs[hidB[d]] 
                  + beta[9]*hwealth[hidB[d]] 
                  + beta[10]*hpastor[hidB[d]] 
                  + beta[11]*drel1[d] 
                  + beta[12]*drel2[d] 
                  + beta[13]*drel3[d] 
                  + beta[14]*drel4[d] 
                  + beta[15]*dlndist[d] 
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                  + beta[16]*dass[d]  
                  + beta[17]*d0125[d]  
                  + gr[hidA[d],1] + gr[hidB[d],2] + dd[d,1] 
     
    # Linear predictor for log of expected gifts from B to A 
    log(muBA[d]) <- offset[d]  
                  + beta[1]   
                  + beta[2]*hgame[hidB[d]] 
                  + beta[3]*hfish[hidB[d]] 
                  + beta[4]*hpigs[hidB[d]] 
                  + beta[5]*hwealth[hidB[d]] 
                  + beta[6]*hgame[hidA[d]] 
                  + beta[7]*hfish[hidA[d]] 
                  + beta[8]*hpigs[hidA[d]] 
                  + beta[9]*hwealth[hidA[d]] 
                  + beta[10]*hpastor[hidA[d]] 
                  + beta[11]*drel1[d] 
                  + beta[12]*drel2[d] 
                  + beta[13]*drel3[d] 
                  + beta[14]*drel4[d] 
                  + beta[15]*dlndist[d] 
                  + beta[16]*dass[d]  
                  + beta[17]*d0125[d] 
                   + gr[hidB[d],1] + gr[hidA[d],2] + dd[d,2] 
     
  } 
 
  # Giver and receiver bivariate normal random effects 
  for (h in 1:25) { 
    gr[h,1:2] ~ dmnorm(zero[1:2],TAU_gr[1:2,1:2]) 
  } 
  zero[1] <- 0 
  zero[2] <- 0 
 
  # Relationship bivariate normal random effects 
  for(d in 1:300) { 
    dd[d,1:2] ~ dmnorm(zero[1:2],TAU_dd[1:2,1:2]) 
  } 
 
  # Priors for fixed effects regression coefficients 
  for (k in 1:17) { 
    beta[k] ~ dflat() 
  } 
 
  # Priors for giver-receiver variance-covariance matrix 
  TAU_gr[1:2,1:2] ~ dwish(R_gr[1:2,1:2],2) 
  COV_gr[1:2,1:2] <- inverse(TAU_gr[,]) 
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  # Priors for relationship variance-covariance matrix   
  TAU_dd[1:2,1:2] <- inverse(COV_dd[1:2,1:2]) 
  COV_dd[1,1] <- sigma2_d 
  COV_dd[1,2] <- sigma_dd 
  COV_dd[2,1] <- sigma_dd 
  COV_dd[2,2] <- sigma2_d 
  sigma_dd <- rho_dd*sigma2_d 
  sigma2_d <- 1/tau_d 
  tau_d ~ dgamma(0.001,0.001) 
  rho_dd ~ dunif(-1,1) 
 
} 
	  The	   file	   begins	  with	   the	  model{}	   statement	   and	   all	   subsequent	   statements	   are	  written	  within	   its	  braces.	  We	  shall	  explain	   these	   individual	  statements	  below.	  However,	   first	   it	   is	  important	  to	  realize	  that	  we	  arrange	  and	  model	  the	  data	  in	  a	  “dyadic	  setup”	  whereby	  there	  is	  one	  record	  per	  dyad	  and	  where	  the	  counts	  from	  household	  A	  to	  B	  and	  from	  household	  B	  to	  A	  are	  stored	  in	  two	  separate	  outcome	  variables.	  We	  shall	  therefore	  implement	  the	  SRM	  as	  bivariate	  response	  model.	  An	  alternative	  approach	  would	  be	  to	  arrange	  the	  model	  and	  data	   in	  a	   “unique	  relationship	  setup”	  where	   there	   is	  one	  record	  per	  directed	  relationship	  and	  all	  the	  counts	  are	  stored	  in	  a	  single	  outcome	  variable.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  SRM	  would	  be	  implemented	  as	   a	  univariate	   response	  model.	  An	  analogy	   is	   the	  modeling	  of	   longitudinal	  panel	  data	  where	  one	  can	  model	   the	  data	  either	   in	  wide	   form	  (one	  record	  per	   individual	  and	  responses	  stored	  in	  separate	  outcome	  variables	  for	  each	  occasion)	  or	   long	  form	  (one	  record	  per	  individual-­‐occasion	  and	  all	  responses	  stored	  in	  a	  single	  outcome	  variable)	  and	  where	  one	  therefore	  fits	  a	  multivariate	  or	  univariate	  response	  model,	  respectively.	  	  We	   have	   indicated	   the	   different	   parts	   of	   the	   above	   model	   statement	   with	   WinBUGS	  comments.	  (WinBUGS	  comments	  begin	  with	  the	  #	  symbol.)	  	  	  
Dyadic	  response	  distributions	  	  The	   dyad-­‐level	   loop	   for(d in 1:300){}	   loops	   over	   the	   300	   dyads	   in	   the	   data.	   We	  specify	  four	  dyad-­‐level	  statements	  within	  this	  loop.	  	  First,	  we	  declare	  the	  number	  of	  gifts	  given	  from	  the	  first	  household	  in	  dyad	  d	  to	  the	  second	  
giftsAB[d]	  to	  be	  Poisson	  distributed	  dpois()	  with	  mean	  muAB[d].	  	  	  Second,	  we	  repeat	  this	  statement	  for	  the	  number	  of	  gifts	  given	  in	  the	  other	  direction,	  from	  the	  second	  household	  in	  the	  dyad	  to	  the	  first.	  	  Third,	  we	  specify	  the	  mean	  muAB[j]	  to	  be	  a	  log-­‐linear	  function	  of	  the	  offset	  offset[d],	  the	   intercept,	   the	   16	   covariates,	   and	   the	   giver,	   receiver	   and	   relationship	   random	   effects,	  
gr[hidB[d],1]	  ,	  gr[hidA[d],2]	  and	  dd[d,2].iii	  The	  covariates	  appear	  in	  the	  model	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  in	  the	  same	  order	  in	  which	  they	  appear	  in	  Table	  2.	  The	  covariate	  vectors	  beginning	  with	  h	  (hgame[],	  	  hfish[]	  and	  so	  on)	  are	  25×1	  vectors	  with	  one	  element	  per	  household,	  while	  the	  covariate	  vectors	  beginning	  with	  d	  (drel1[],	  drel2[]	  and	  so	  on)	  are	  300×1	  vectors	  with	  one	  element	  per	  dyad.	  The	  nested	  indexing	  hidA[d]	  and	  hidB[d]	  associated	  with	  the	   household	   vectors	   are	   used	   to	   “look	   up”	   and	   return	   the	   household	   identifier	   h	  associated	  with	  dyad	  d.	   The	  giver-­‐receiver	   random	  effects	  matrix	  gr[]	   is	   a	  25×2	  matrix	  with	  one	  row	  per	  household	  and	  where	  the	  first	  column	  refers	  to	  the	  giver	  random	  effects	  and	  the	  second	  the	  receiver	  random	  effects.	  The	  relationship	  random	  effects	  matrix	  dd[]	  is	   a	  300×2 	  matrix	   with	   one	   row	   per	   dyad	   and	   where	   the	   first	   column	   stores	   the	  relationship	   effects	   from	   the	   first	   to	   the	   second	  household	   in	   the	  dyad,	  while	   the	   second	  column	  stores	  the	  relationship	  effects	  from	  the	  second	  household	  to	  the	  first	  household	  in	  the	  dyad.	  	  Fourth,	  we	  repeat	  the	  third	  statement	  for	  the	  number	  of	  gifts	  given	  in	  the	  other	  direction,	  from	  the	  second	  household	  in	  the	  dyad	  to	  the	  first.	  	  	  
Giver	  and	  receiver	  bivariate	  normal	  random	  effects	  	  The	  household-­‐level	  loop	  for(h in 1:25){}	  loops	  over	  the	  25	  households	  in	  the	  data.	  The	   giver	   and	   receiver	   random	   effects	   gr[h,1:2]	   are	   specified	   as	   bivariate	   normally	  distributed	   dmnorm(,)	   with	   zero	   mean	   vector	   zero[1:2]	   and	  2×2 	  giver-­‐receiver	  precision	  matrix	  TAU_gr[1:2,1:2].iv	  (The	  precision	  matrix	   is	  simply	  the	  inverse	  of	  the	  variance-­‐covariance	   matrix.)	   Immediately	   after	   the	   loop,	   we	   specify	   the	   vector	   zero	   to	  take	  fixed	  values	  of	  0.	  
	  
	  
Relationship	  bivariate	  normal	  random	  effects	  	  The	   dyad-­‐level	   loop	   for(d in 1:300){}	   loops	   over	   the	   300	   dyads	   in	   the	   data.	   The	  relationship	   random	   effects	   dd[d,1:2]	   are	   specified	   as	   bivariate	   normally	   distributed	  
dmnorm(,)	   with	   zero	   mean	   vector	   zero[1:2]	   and	  2×2	  relationship	   precision	   matrix	  
TAU_dd[1:2,1:2].	  	  	  
Priors	  for	  fixed	  effects	  regression	  coefficients	  	  The	  parameter-­‐level	   loop	  for(k in 1:20){}	   loops	  over	  the	  20	  regression	  coefficients	  in	   the	   model.	   We	   specify	   non-­‐informative	   flat	   dflat()	   prior	   distributions	   for	   all	  coefficients.	  	  	  
Priors	  for	  giver-­‐receiver	  variance-­‐covariance	  matrix	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  2	  	  We	   specify	   the	   giver-­‐receiver	   precision	   matrix	   TAU_gr[1:2,1:2] to	   be	   Wishart	  
dwish()	   distributed	  with	   scale	  matrix	  R_gr[1:2,1:2]	   and	  2	   degrees	  of	   freedom.	  We	  then	   define	   the	   giver-­‐receiver	   covariance	   matrix	   COV_gr[1:2,1:2]	   to	   be	   the	   matrix	  inverse	  inverse()	  of	  this	  precision	  matrix.	  	  	  
Priors	  for	  relationship	  variance-­‐covariance	  matrix	  	  We	   define	   the	   relationship	   precision	   matrix	   TAU_dd[1:2,1:2]	   as	   the	   matrix	   inverse	  
inverse()	  of	  the	  relationship	  covariance	  matrix	  COV_dd[i,1:2,1:2].	  We	  specify	  the	  relationship	   variances,	   COV_dd[1,1] and	   COV_dd[2,2],	   to	   be	   equal	   to	   the	   scalar	  
sigma2_d.	  We	  specify	   the	  covariance	  matrix	   to	  be	  symmetric	  by	  setting	   the	  covariances	  
COV_dd[1,2]	   and	  COV_dd[2,1]	   to	  be	   equal	   to	   the	   scalar	  sigma_dd.	  We	   then	  define	  this	  relationship	  covariance	  as	  equal	  to	  the	  relationship	  correlation	  rho_dd	  multiplied	  by	  the	  relationship	  variance	  sigma2_d.	  We	  define	  this	  relationship	  variance	  as	  the	  reciprocal	  of	   the	   relationship	   precision	  tau_d.	  We	   specify	   this	   precision	   to	   be	   gamma	  dgamma()	  distributed	  with	  diffuse	  shape	  parameters	  0.001	  and	  0.001.	  We	  specify	  the	  relationship	  correlation	  to	  be	  uniform	  dunif()	  distributed	  on	  the	  domain	  -1	  to	  1.	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  The	   file	   contains	  17	  variables	   each	   stored	  as	   a	   separate	   list	  c().	  We	  display	   the	   first	  10	  elements	  (data	  values)	  of	  each	  list	  and	  have	  inserted	  ...	  to	  denote	  the	  subsequent	  omitted	  elements.	  The	   variables	  hidA	   through	  d0125	   are	  dyad-­‐level	   variables	   and	   are	   stored	   in	  lists	  of	   length	  300.	  The	  variables	  hgame	   through	  hpastor	  are	  household	   level	  variables	  and	  are	  stored	  in	  lists	  of	  length	  25.	  The	  final	  entry	  R_gr	  is	  the	  scale	  matrix	  associated	  with	  the	  Wishart	  prior	  for	  the	  giver-­‐receiver	  covariance	  matrix.	  	  	  





) 	  We	  set	  the	  initial	  values	  for	  the	  17	  coefficients	  to	  0.	  The	  initial	  values	  for	  the	  giver-­‐receiver	  precision	  matrix	  TAU_gr	  correspond	  to	  specifying	  giver	  and	  receiver	  variances	  of	  0.5	  and	  a	  generalized	  reciprocity	  of	  0.	  The	  initial	  value	  for	  the	  relationship	  precision	  tau_d	  of	  1.333	  corresponds	  to	  a	  relationship	  variance	  of	  0.75.	  The	  initial	  value	  for	  the	  dyadic	  reciprocity	  
rho_dd	   is	  0.5.	  These	  are	  somewhat	  arbitrary	  choices	  and	  so	  we	  specify	  a	  long	  burn-­‐in	  of	  50,000	   iterations	   to	   minimize	   the	   sensitivity	   of	   the	   monitoring	   iterations	   to	   the	   initial	  values.	   Nonetheless,	   it	   is	   good	   practice	   to	   test	   the	   sensitivity	   of	   the	   model	   results	   to	  different	  sets	  of	  initial	  values.	  	  	  





















quit() 	  The	   display('log')	   command	   opens	   a	   log	   file	   where	   the	   WinBUGS	   output	   will	   be	  saved.	   The	  check()	   command	   checks	   that	   the	   syntax	   in	   the	  model	   specification	   file	   is	  syntactically	   correct.	   The	   data()	   command	   loads	   the	   data	   file.	   The	   compile(1)	  command	  compiles	  a	  single	  chain	  while	  the	  inits(1,)	  command	  loads	  the	  initial	  values	  file	   for	   this	   chain.	   The	  gen.inits()	   command	  generates	   random	   initial	   values	   for	   any	  uninitialized	   chains,	   which	   in	   this	   example	   are	   the	   chains	   for	   the	   giver,	   receiver	   and	  relationship	   random	   effects.v	  	   The	   first	  update()	   command	   updates	   the	   chain	  with	   the	  burn-­‐in	  iterations.	  We	  specify	  a	  burn-­‐in	  of	  50000	  iterations	  so	  that	  the	  chains	  can	  converge	  to	   their	   stationary	   distributions.vi	  The	   set()	   commands	   specify	   the	   parameters	   to	   be	  monitored.	   In	   this	   example,	   we	   chose	   to	   monitor	   both	   the	   parameters	   and	   the	   random	  effects.	  The	  thin.samples()	  command	  retains	  only	  every	  100th	  iteration	  for	  inference.	  The	  dic.set()	   command	  calculates	   the	  DIC	  statistic.	  The	  second	  update()	   command	  updates	  the	  chain	  with	  the	  monitoring	  iterations.	  We	  specify	  a	  monitoring	  chain	  of	  100000	  iterations	   to	   ensure	   that	   the	   chains	   fully	   explore	   the	   posterior	   distributions.vii 	  Upon	  completion,	   the	  dic.stats()	   command	  displays	   the	  DIC	   statistic	  while	   the	  stats(*)	  command	   displays	   posterior	   summaries	   for	   the	   monitored	   parameters	   including	   their	  means	  and	  standard	  deviations.	  The	  coda(*,)	  command	  writes	  the	  sampled	  values	  of	  the	  monitored	   parameters	   to	   two	   files:	   out21.txt	   and	   out2Index.txt.	   The	   first	   file	  includes	  the	  sampled	  values	  for	  the	  parameters,	  stacked	  sequentially.	  The	  second	  file	  saves	  the	  ordering	  of	  the	  saved	  parameters.	  The	  sampled	  values	  can	  be	  imported	  as	  data	  into	  any	  general-­‐purpose	   statistical	   software	   package	   to	   produce	   plots	   of	   the	  model	   results	   or	   to	  perform	   additional	   calculations.	   The	   save()	   command	   saves	   the	   log	   file.	   The	   quit()	  command	  quits	  WinBUGS.	  	  	  
Model	  results	  	  To	   fit	   the	   model,	   you	   must	   first	   save	   model2.txt,	   data2.txt,	   inits2.txt	   and	  
script2.txt	   to	  C:/data.	   If	  you	  choose	  an	  alternative	  directory,	  you	  will	  need	   to	  edit	  the	  directory	  locations	  specified	  in	  script2.txt.	  Next,	  open	  WinBUGS,	  then	  open	  (File 
> Open)	  the	  script2.txt	  script	  file.	  You	  will	  need	  to	  select	  Text(*.txt)	  from	  the	  file	  type	  drop-­‐down	  list	   located	  in	  the	  bottom	  right-­‐hand	  corner	  of	  the	  File	  Open	  window.	  Fit	  the	  model	  by	  running	  the	  script	  file	  then	  fit	  the	  model	  by	  running	  the	  script	  file	  (Model > 
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Script).	  viii	  Upon	   completion,	   a	   table	   of	   posterior	   summary	   estimates	  of	   the	  parameters	  and	  giver,	  receiver	  and	  relationship	  random	  effects	  will	  be	  written	  to	  the	  log	  file	  log.txt.	  The	  Model	  2	  results	  presented	  in	  Table	  2	  of	  the	  paper	  are	  the	  results	  obtained	  from	  this	  log	  file.	   A	   partial	   listing	   of	   these	   results	   is	   presented	   below.ix	  	   The	   posterior	  mean,	   standard	  deviation	  2.5th,	  50th	  and	  97.5th	  quantiles	  for	  each	  parameter	  are	  displayed.	  	  
node         mean      sd        2.50%     median   97.50% 
beta[1] -0.9212 0.634 -2.176 -0.8761 0.237 
beta[2] 0.4496 0.08449 0.2737 0.4506 0.6148 
beta[3] 0.2693 0.7691 -1.322 0.2512 1.807 
beta[4] 0.1176 0.05357 0.01295 0.1194 0.2191 
beta[5] 0.005223 0.0241 -0.03884 0.005489 0.05344 
beta[6] -0.09501 0.06716 -0.2225 -0.09633 0.04697 
beta[7] -0.7673 0.5756 -1.93 -0.7683 0.3465 
beta[8] -0.05593 0.04429 -0.1389 -0.05747 0.02971 
beta[9] -0.04774 0.01868 -0.08529 -0.04772 -0.01175 
beta[10] 0.7851 0.3747 0.04726 0.7821 1.539 
beta[11] 1.471 0.2559 0.9639 1.474 1.972 
beta[12] 0.9441 0.1709 0.611 0.9425 1.298 
beta[13] 0.2711 0.1423 0.004566 0.2672 0.5358 
beta[14] 0.01005 0.1353 -0.2589 0.01271 0.2681 
beta[15] -0.6279 0.07978 -0.7844 -0.6273 -0.4582 
beta[16] 4.016 0.6524 2.733 3.994 5.358 
beta[17] 2.465 0.6242 1.244 2.464 3.69 
COV_gr[1,1] 0.3041 0.1168 0.1461 0.2815 0.5861 
COV_gr[1,2] 0.01919 0.06565 -0.1101 0.01633 0.1668 
COV_gr[2,1] 0.01919 0.06565 -0.1101 0.01633 0.1668 
COV_gr[2,2] 0.1773 0.07221 0.08341 0.1647 0.3568 
COV_dd[1,1] 0.2947 0.04386 0.2165 0.2933 0.385 
COV_dd[1,2] 0.2275 0.04626 0.1451 0.2268 0.3236 
COV_dd[2,1] 0.2275 0.04626 0.1451 0.2268 0.3236 
COV_dd[2,2] 0.2947 0.04386 0.2165 0.2933 0.385 
gr[1,1] 0.006127 0.2799 -0.5885 0.01231 0.573 
gr[1,2] -0.4557 0.2224 -0.8996 -0.4622 -0.007019 
gr[2,1] 0.3819 0.3537 -0.2981 0.3803 1.068 
gr[2,2] 0.09682 0.2786 -0.4375 0.09459 0.6409 
  ...      
gr[25,1] 0.1232 0.291 -0.4357 0.1329 0.6945 
gr[25,2] 0.2711 0.2222 -0.1657 0.2594 0.7519  
dd[1,1] 0.03277 0.4441 -0.8713 0.04425 0.8478 
dd[1,2] 0.1612 0.4096 -0.6426 0.1508 0.9772 
dd[2,1] 0.9027 0.3477 0.2557 0.8994 1.615 
dd[2,2] 0.8281 0.2602 0.3345 0.8328 1.329 
  ...      
dd[300,1] 0.1197 0.4632 -0.7817 0.115 1.033 
dd[300,2] 0.04203 0.4693 -0.8991 0.03652 0.9767 
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  i	  WinBUGS	   can	   also	   be	   used	   interactively	   via	   its	   graphical	   user	   interface	   (GUI).	   However,	   we	   prefer	   to	   fit	  models	  in	  batch	  model	  via	  script	  files	  as	  this	  facilitates	  replicating	  analyses	  at	  a	  later	  date.	  ii	  While	   our	   preference	   is	   to	   call	   WinBUGS	   from	   within	   Stata	   using	   the	   user	   written	   winbugs	   command	  (Thompson	  et	  al.,	  2006),	  in	  this	  file	  we	  demonstrate	  how	  to	  use	  WinBUGS	  as	  a	  standalone	  package.	  iii	  The	  assignment	  sign	  <-	  corresponds	  to	  the	  =	  sign	  used	  in	  the	  algebraic	  representation	  of	  the	  model.	  iv	  A	  quirk	  of	  WinBUGS	  is	  that	  normal	  distributions	  are	  parameterized	  in	  terms	  of	  means	  and	  precisions	  rather	  than	  means	  and	  variances.	  	  v	  In	  Bayesian	  estimation,	  the	  random	  effects	  are	  viewed	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  parameters,	  as	  unknown	  random	  variables.	  vi	  We	   judged	   convergence	   by	   informal	   visual	   assessments	   of	   the	   parameter	   chains	   (not	   shown	   here)	   and	  through	   examining	   standard	   MCMC	   convergence	   diagnostics.	   A	   burn-­‐in	   chain	   of	   50,000	   was	   found	   to	   be	  sufficient	  for	  all	  models.	  vii	  As	  with	  convergence,	  we	  judged	  whether	  the	  parameter	  chains	  were	  mixing	  sufficiently	  through	  informal	  visual	  assessments	  of	  the	  parameter	  chains	  and	  through	  examining	  MCMC	  diagnostics.	  A	  monitoring	  chain	  of	  100,000	  was	  found	  to	  be	  sufficient	  for	  all	  models.	  viii	  The	  model	   took	   approximately	   two	   hours	   to	   run	   on	   a	   2.66Ghz	   Intel	   Xeon	   X7460	   processer	   running	   on	  Windows	  Server	  2008.	  ix	  We	  have	  removed	  three	  columns	  (MC	  error,	  start	  and	  sample)	  from	  the	  table	  so	  that	  the	  output	  fits	  on	  the	  page.	  
